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This Article evaluates recent dramatic developments in Delaware law surrounding
merger litigation and concludes that they have gone too far in limiting the ability to challenge
managerial wrongdoing in the takeover context. The past three years have seen a sea change
in merger litigation, brought on by the twin earthquakes of the Delaware Supreme Court’s
decision in Corwin v. KKR and the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in In re
Trulia. Both of these decisions were inspired by a perceived crisis in merger litigation. By
2015, the percentage of economically significant deals challenged by at least one lawsuit had
been hovering at or above 90% for years. The vast bulk of these suits were resolved via
“disclosure only” settlements that provided little or no value to stockholders, but secured broad
releases from liability for defendants and significant fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys. Decades of
academic debate over the merits of stockholder litigation had reached a rare degree of consensus:
at least with regard to merger lawsuits, the merits were meaningless and litigation had devolved
into absurdity.
The explosion of dubious merger litigation demanded a response. On the one hand, most
prominently in In re Trulia, the Court of Chancery took direct and long-overdue measures
to remove the incentives that drove the crisis by increasing scrutiny of low-value settlements
and accompanying releases of liability. On the other hand, a series of ill-considered decisions
culminating in Corwin allowed defendants to avoid judicial scrutiny altogether by adopting
various procedural safeguards, despite the lack of evidence that these safeguards will be
effective. These decisions will almost certainly reduce merger litigation but are likely to do so
relatively indiscriminately, blocking frivolous and meritorious claims alike. This Article
concludes that the procedural safe harbors created in Corwin and its brethren should be
reconsidered as unjustified by the recent merger litigation crisis, and inconsistent with
longstanding Delaware law and the realities of merger practice.
INTRODUCTION
Despite its youth, the twenty-first century has already seen two sea changes in
Delaware merger litigation. The waters rose, and now the waters are falling back.
After hovering around 40% for years, the percentage of merger deals challenged by
at least one class action lawsuit surged after 2008, remaining over 90% for several
years and even approaching 95% in some years.1 Then, just as abruptly, the wave

1. See Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603,
620 (2018) [hereinafter Shifting Tides]; Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
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crested and began to recede. By 2016, the percentage of deals facing a lawsuit
dropped to 73%, with suits in Delaware cut nearly in half.2 Early data suggest the
rapid drop has continued into 2017, particularly in the Delaware Court of
Chancery.3 The factors leading to the sharp rise in merger litigation are subject to
some dispute. The recent drop, however, was manifestly the result of recent judicial
actions in Delaware.
These actions came in response to a rare degree of consensus among both
academics and practitioners alike: the system was clearly broken. Nearly every
economically significant deal resulted in fiduciary duty litigation, and the vast bulk
of such cases resolved with little or no benefit to stockholders—but with handsome
fees for the lawyers and broad releases for the defendants.4 Such a system could
provide neither meaningful deterrence of wrongdoing nor meaningful
compensation for aggrieved stockholders, and ultimately served no plausible social
purpose other than as an employment program for lawyers.
The response of the Delaware courts was two-pronged and almost
immediately effective at reducing merger litigation. The first prong—which I argue
below was a mistake—was a substantive relaxation of the standard of review for
merger-related claims, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail.5 A long
series of cases had gradually weakened the entire fairness standard that had been
applied to majority stockholder squeeze-outs since the landmark Weinberger decision
in 1983.6 This weakening reached its culmination in the 2014 case Kahn v. M&F
Worldwide Corp. (MFW).7 In MFW, the Delaware Supreme Court held that approval
by an empowered committee of independent directors and a majority of the
minority stockholder vote would entitle a majority stockholder squeeze-out to
business judgment rule deference.8
The next year, the court carried the reasoning behind MFW to its logical
conclusion, holding in Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC (Corwin) that “when a
merger that is not subject to the entire fairness standard of review has been
Takeover Litigation in 2014 (Feb. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript, available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2567902 [ https://perma.cc/ZG3A-XPUD ]).
2. See Shifting Tides, supra note 1, at 608, 620.
3. See, e.g., John A. Neuwirth et al., Impact of ‘Trulia’ on Merger Litigation in State and Federal
Courts, DEL. BUS. CT. INSIDER (Nov. 29, 2017); Jeffrey Wolters & Nathan Emeritz, Delaware
Litigation 2017: Assessing Trends at Year-End, LAW360 (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.law360.com/
articles/996247/print?section=delaware [ https://perma.cc/R4SH-3B8M ].
4. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 165 (2015) [ hereinafter A Great Game ]; Jill Fisch, Sean
Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015); Charles R. Korsmo & Minor
Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L. J. 829 (2014).
5. See generally Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Delaware’s
Takeover Standards, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING
UP? (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas, eds., 2019) [ hereinafter Rise and Fall ].
6. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
7. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
8. Id.
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approved by a fully informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested
stockholders,” the appropriate standard of review in a post-closing damages action
is the business judgment rule, rather than enhanced scrutiny under either Revlon9 or
Unocal.10 In early 2016, the Court of Chancery extended Corwin to provide business
judgment rule deference to a two-stage merger involving a tender offer, where a
majority of shares had been voluntarily tendered.11 As a result, class actions seeking
post-closing damages are effectively a dead letter unless the plaintiff can show a
deficiency in disclosure that would render the stockholder vote (or decision to
tender) uninformed.12
The second prong of the Delaware courts’ response was to target the engine
that powered the merger litigation crisis: low-value settlements accompanied by
broad releases. In a series of cases, the Court of Chancery judges began to criticize,
and ultimately to reject, low-value settlements—particularly those providing only
additional disclosure, with no financial recovery—accompanied by broad releases
of liability.13 This judicial antipathy was ultimately formalized in Chancellor
Bouchard’s January 2016 decision in In re Trulia (Trulia), which rejected a settlement
providing only additional disclosures and a broad release.14 The Chancellor went on
to make clear that, going forward, such disclosure-only settlements are disfavored,
and will only be approved if the additional disclosures are “plainly material” and any
accompanying release of liability is “narrowly circumscribed.”15
These developments have, not surprisingly, been greeted with wide acclaim by
the M&A bar and in the deal-making community generally. Academic critics of
merger litigation have also, for the most part, welcomed them.16 For example, two
9.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
10. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
11. In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727 (Del. Ch. 2016).
12. See Shifting Tides, supra note 1, at 4 (“The net effect of [Corwin and Volcano] was to limit
substantially the availability of a post-closing suit for damages. Only if the target failed to disclose the
alleged improprieties prior to shareholder approval of the transaction would the court allow a claim to
proceed.”).
13. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 74–75, In re Aruba
Networks Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015); Transcript of Settlement
and Hearings of the Court at 14, In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG,
(Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015). As early as 2011, then-Chancellor Strine—now Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court—remarked on the anomalous nature of the so-called “disclosure-only” settlement:
[I]t’s an odd thing about this job that you can award a lot of money to someone for a case
and award money to an attorney when, in other contexts of the law—no medical malpractice
plaintiff’s lawyer walks out of cases with money in her pocket and turns on the client and
says, “Well, remember, you’ve got that explanation about why the doctor made his choice
in the operating room, and I know you feel a lot better. You don’t have any money, but you
know why the doctor made the choice he made with the scalpel, and I’ve got a couple
hundred thousand dollars.
Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and the Court’s Ruling
at 30, In re Danvers Bankcorp, Inc. S’holders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 6162-CS (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2011).
14. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
15. Id. at 898.
16. The ultimate holding of MFW had been urged years before by several prominent corporate
law scholars. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders,

First to Printer_Korsmo (Do Not Delete)

2019]

DELAWARE’S RETREAT

10/29/2019 1:34 PM

59

of the most prominent scholars of merger litigation, Steven Davidoff Solomon and
Randall Thomas,17 have recently depicted the move away from heightened
standards of review as a largely justified response to the changing corporate
governance environment. They point to three factors in particular: First, the set of
strong norms for deal practice that has taken root, following the roadmap provided
by three decades of Delaware case law; second, the rise of institutional and activist
investors better able to protect themselves through informed voting; and third, the
increasing prevalence of independent directors, in part spurred by federal securities
law.18
In addition to these justifications, some have argued that Corwin does not
really represent a change in the law at all. Most prominent is the author of the Corwin
opinion, Chief Justice Strine, himself. The opinion in Corwin is relatively brief and
portrays itself as a fairly pedestrian application, rather than a re-imagining, of prior
precedent. In subsequent public statements, as well, the Chief Justice has argued
that Corwin is simply a straightforward application of long-standing Delaware
doctrine.19 Under this view, the heightened scrutiny provided by Unocal and Revlon
was never intended to apply to post-closing damages in the first place. As Chief
Justice Strine wrote in Corwin, “Unocal and Revlon are primarily designed to give
stockholders and the Court of Chancery the tool of injunctive relief to address
important M&A decisions in real time, before closing. They were not tools designed
with post-closing money damages claims in mind.”20
Given the amount of commentary Corwin has provoked, the claim that it is
nothing new is, on its face, difficult to credit.21 It is, however, true that Corwin
follows directly from MFW. Once you hold that the procedural trappings of an
arm’s-length deal entitle a majority stockholder squeeze-out to business judgment

152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 839–40 (2003); Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2,
60–61 (2005).
17. See Rise and Fall, supra note 5. Solomon has co-authored a number of influential articles
chronicling and critiquing the boom in merger litigation. See, e.g., A Great Game, supra note 4; Cain &
Solomon, supra note 1; Fisch, Griffith & Solomon, supra note 4. Among his many excellent articles on
merger litigation, a 2004 study co-authored by Thomas first drew attention to the increasing prevalence
of merger class actions. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004).
18. See Rise and Fall, supra note 5, at 2.
19. At the 2017 Tulane Corporate Law Institute conference, for example, Chief Justice Strine
stated that “[i]f you read the footnote in Corwin, where there’s 57 prior cases cited, there’s nothing new
about this. And it’s nothing new either that it applies to tender offers or to the vote, because the prior
cases, if you read the old law—the old time religion—if you accepted the benefits of the transaction,
you could not stultify yourself and then sue on the transaction.” M&A Practice: In a New Age, 17
M&A J. 1, 4–5 [hereinafter M&A Practice: In a New Age].
20. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015).
21. At the 2017 Tulane Corporate Law Institute conference, in reference to Chief Justice
Strine’s claim that Corwin did not represent a change, the moderator of the next panel—dedicated to
the aftermath of Corwin—delicately noted that “[w]hile that may be true as a matter of law, I think
members of the panel would certainly agree that this past year has seen some very, very significant
developments in Delaware corporate law.” M&A Practice: In a New Age, supra note 19, at 7.
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rule deference, it would be strange indeed to deny such deference to an actual
arm’s-length deal.22 But whether MFW itself is a faithful continuation of preexisting law is more debatable. It is certainly true that Revlon, Unocal, and their direct
descendants are not post-closing damages cases, and that Delaware case law is
surprisingly mum on the standard of review for such cases. This silence, however,
is largely an artifact of such cases having historically been almost universally
dismissed or settled before trial.23 It is a mistake to infer too much from this silence.
In a larger sense, the question of whether or not MFW and Corwin are
consistent with prior law is of little consequence, except as a window into the
Delaware Supreme Court’s thinking. As then-Chancellor Strine wrote in MFW,
“tradition should admittedly not persist if it lacks current value.”24 The real question
is simply whether business judgment rule deference—making a challenge effectively
impossible—is warranted whenever a merger has been approved by independent
directors and a stockholder vote.
It is not.25 To understand why, it is necessary to consider why merger-related
decisions merit enhanced scrutiny in the first place. Enhanced scrutiny is necessary
because the merger context inevitably creates conflicts of interest between
management and directors on the one hand and stockholders on the other. If these
conflicts were limited to management’s desire to entrench themselves by fending
off hostile offers or erecting deal protections around a sale to a favored bidder (the
situations confronted in Unocal and Revlon) then limiting enhanced scrutiny to the
pre-closing stage—when defensive measures can be evaluated in real-time—would
be sensible. But merger-related conflicts are not so contained.
Two additional conflicts are particularly salient. First is the ever-present risk
that management will seek to divert as much of the proceeds of the merger as
22. Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster made precisely this point in an article a year before Corwin
was written. See J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny,
40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443 (2014).
23. Indeed, it is difficult to see how some of the most prominent settlements of recent decades
could have been reached under Corwin. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. 6949-CS
(Del. Ch. 2012) (settling merger-related claims for $110 million); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holder
Litig., C.A. 6027-VCL (Del. Ch. 2011) (settling merger-related claims that for $89.4 million). Under
Corwin, the conflicts at issue in El Paso and Del Monte could simply have been disclosed and would have
been cleansed in the likely event that the stockholders still voted to approve the mergers.
24. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 527 (Del. Ch. 2013).
25. Candor compels me to acknowledge at the outset that this conclusion may appear to be in
tension with the arguments I have made elsewhere that the stockholder class action ought to be
eliminated altogether. See, e.g., Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition: Replacing
Class Actions with a Market for Legal Claims, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1323 (2016); Charles R. Korsmo &
Minor Myers, Competition and the Future of M&A Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 19 (2014). As
discussed more fully below, my views have not substantially changed. In my prior work, I have argued
that the merger class action should be eliminated and replaced by either a strengthened appraisal remedy
or a market for legal claims (via elimination of the contemporaneous ownership requirement). See id. In
reality, the contemporaneous ownership requirement remains in place, and—as is discussed more fully
in my recent paper with Minor Myers—Delaware courts have moved to weaken the appraisal remedy
rather than strengthen it. See Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Flawed Corporate Finance of Dell and
DFC Global, 68 Emory L.J. 220 (2018).
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possible to themselves, via employment agreements, change-in-control payments,
parachute packages, or other transaction-related side-deals. Second is that, even
leaving aside the possibility of side-payments not available to stockholders,
management will often have a lower reservation price than diversified public
stockholders, by virtue of their concentrated economic and human capital
investments in the firm. As non-diversified investors, managers will be rationally
risk-averse, and therefore willing to sell the firm at a price below what diversified
stockholders would hold out for if given the opportunity to negotiate. As discussed
below, neither of these conflicts is well-suited to regulation by pre-closing
preliminary injunction.
Nonetheless, such conflicts only warrant enhanced judicial scrutiny if they
cannot be policed adequately by other monitors. The conclusion drawn by the
MFW and Corwin courts is that independent directors and minority stockholders
can perform such a monitoring function, rendering judicial scrutiny superfluous.
This conclusion, however, is incorrect. It flies in the face of a substantial body
of empirical literature on the inefficacy of independent directors as informed and
motivated monitors of insider misbehavior. It also overstates the cleansing effect of
a stockholder vote. Fundamentally, a merger vote is typically a Hobson’s
choice—approve the merger as is or reject it altogether—rather than anything
resembling a traditional ratification. The stockholders’ judgment that a deal is better
than no deal should not be mistaken for a judgment that the deal is fair, let alone
the “best price available,” as Revlon tasked boards with seeking.26 Nor should
stockholders be presumed to be informed, even in the absence of colorable
disclosure violations. The rise of institutional shareholding has not substantially
changed this equation. While institutional investors may be sophisticated, they can
rarely be considered informed as to fundamental value. Indeed, an increasing
percentage of shares are held by passive index funds that make little or no attempt
to assess the value of individual firms. And even active fund managers labor under
a huge information deficit in relation to the managers who control what information
will be disclosed in the merger proxy.27
Nor can we look to industry norms as a bulwark against managerial
opportunism. It is certainly possible that the deal-making norms built up since the
1980s will persist even after the legal landscape has shifted to eliminate the
possibility of post-closing damages. It seems less likely, however, that managers and
directors were moved to obey these norms by their respect for the wisdom of
Delaware’s judges than that they were motivated by fear of their sanctions. As that
fear subsides, it would be naïve to expect these norms to persist unaltered. Indeed,
early evidence from the post-Corwin era shows that merger premia have fallen to

26. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1985).
27. See Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 327 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“[O]ne hopes that
directors and officers can always say that they know more about the company than the company’s
stockholders—after all, they are paid to know more.”).
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historic lows, and the percentage of deal value paid out to managers as
change-of-control payments has spiked.28
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly summarizes the recent surge
in merger litigation and the crisis atmosphere it created. Part II traces the judicial
response, primarily in Trulia and a series of cases culminating in MFW and Corwin.
Part III situates MFW and Corwin in Delaware merger law, and canvasses the main
justifications for their holdings. Part IV critiques these justifications, concluding
that these cases represent an unwarranted weakening of judicial scrutiny of merger
transactions. Part V concludes, offering some suggestions for how to limit the
damage wrought by Corwin.
I. THE MERGER LITIGATION CRISIS
In order to understand the Delaware courts’ recent takeover jurisprudence, it
is first necessary to get some sense of the context. Accordingly, this Section does
two things. First, it provides a brief account of the ubiquity of takeover litigation in
recent years and the character of that litigation.29 Second, it documents the
increasing evidence that this litigation provided little benefit to stockholders and
the growing sense that merger litigation was in urgent need of reform.
A. The Merger Litigation Boom
Class action lawsuits challenging director actions in acquisitions are not a new
phenomenon.30 At least since the 1980s, and the landmark cases of Unocal (applying
enhanced scrutiny to takeover defenses)31 and Revlon (specifying a board’s duty to
obtain the highest price reasonably available and subjecting their efforts to enhanced
scrutiny),32 merger challenges have been one of the rare contexts where stockholder
plaintiffs could hope to avoid application of the highly deferential business
judgment rule.
28. See Matthew Schoenfeld, The High Cost of Fewer Appraisal Claims in 2017: Premia Down,
Agency Costs Up, at 4–5 (2017). One should be cautious in interpreting these results. In particular, it is
possible that both low premia and high change-in-control payments are artifacts of unusually high
market valuations in 2017. On both metrics, however, 2017 mergers look substantially worse than
mergers during the last market peak in 2007. See id. at 4.
29. For a more complete discussion of the historical data on takeover litigation, see A Great
Game, supra note 4; Shifting Tides, supra note 1; and Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
Takeover Litigation in 2015 ( Jan. 14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Berkeley Center
for Law, Business and the Economy), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 [ https://perma.cc/5YNQUGNU ]. Much of the data presented in this section is drawn from these sources.
30. See A Great Game, supra note 4, at 111 (“Takeover litigation has existed for some time in
Delaware.”).
31. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“Because of the
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests [by enacting takeover
defenses], rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which
calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may
be conferred.”); Rise and Fall, supra note 5, at 3 (Unocal “held that such defensive actions would be
subject to a heightened standard of review.”).
32. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1985).
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Earlier data is scarce, but an influential study found that by the turn of the
century, “the vast bulk” of state court stockholder litigation consisted of “class
actions against public companies challenging director action in an acquisition.”33 At
the time, the authors of the study were cautiously optimistic about this
development. On the one hand, they found some of the classic markers of litigation
agency costs, suggesting the litigation may have been serving the interests of the
plaintiffs’ lawyers more than the interests of the stockholders.34 On the other hand,
they found that—unlike with securities fraud class actions—a substantial number
of merger cases led to meaningful monetary settlements, and that these settlements
appeared to correlate with the potential merit of the claims.35
Optimism faded, however, in the face of subsequent developments. In early
2012, Matthew Cain and Steven Davidoff Solomon released a working paper
documenting a recent, and massive, increase in the incidence of merger litigation.36
As late as 2007, fewer than 40% of transactions (96 of 248) were challenged by a
fiduciary duty class action.37 This volume of litigation may already have been
excessive—that so many mergers might involve culpable breaches of fiduciary duty
strains credulity. Nonetheless, the fact that most mergers went unchallenged
suggests at least some degree of restraint and discrimination on the part of plaintiff’s
lawyers. This restraint did not last. By 2009, Cain and Solomon found 85% of
transactions (62 out of 73) faced at least one suit.38 By 2011, the proportion had
reached 92% (117 out of 127), with an average of five lawsuits being brought against
each transaction.39 The inescapable conclusion was that merger challenges were
now being brought virtually indiscriminately.40

33. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 137 (2004).
34. See id. at 138 (“For example, in most cases multiple lawsuits with virtually identical
complaints are quickly filed, usually within a few days of the announcement of the proposed acquisition.
Over 75 percent of the time, the cases are filed by a small, well-defined group of plaintiff’s law firms
in the name of a professional cadre of plaintiff shareholders.”).
35. See id. (“[W]e find that there were large monetary settlements paid to shareholders in
many of these cases . . . .”); id. at 138–39 (“Furthermore, beneficial settlements…are concentrated
in cases where a majority shareholder is squeezing out minority public shareholders on
disadvantageous terms . . . [and] are more likely to occur in cases where the initial offer price was
substantially lower . . . .”).
36. The working paper would ultimately become A Great Game, supra note 4.
37. Id. at 112.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 112–13.
40. Even prominent plaintiffs’ attorneys, while counseling against drastic reforms, admitted that
“it is troubling that a majority of public corporation mergers results in a lawsuit.” Mark Lebovitch &
Jeroen Van Kwawegen, Of Babies and Bathwater: Deterring Frivolous Stockholder Suits Without Closing
the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate Claims, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 491 (2016).
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B. The Building Consensus for Change
The disposition of these (suddenly ubiquitous) merger claims gave a clue to
the incentives that drove them. Approximately 28% of such claims were dismissed
in one form or another.41 The remaining 72% were all settled, without a single case
from Cain and Solomon’s sample proceeding to final judgment.42 Of the settled
cases, nearly 80% were so-called “disclosure only” settlements, where the only relief
for the stockholders is an agreement by the parties to the merger to provide
additional or corrected disclosures.43 Despite the lack of financial relief, such
settlements resulted in an average of $750,000 being awarded to the plaintiff’s
attorneys. In only a handful of cases, from a sample covering seven years and
hundreds of cases, did the plaintiff’s attorney even claim that the suit had resulted
in additional cash for stockholders.44
The incentives for the plaintiff’s lawyers were obvious enough, but the system
had something in it for defendants, as well. As Professors Griffith and Lahav
pointed out, this indiscriminate pattern of litigation benefited defendants by
allowing them to secure global releases of all potential fiduciary claims at relatively
low cost—less than the cost of actually litigating even a frivolous claim.45 As a result,
frivolous claims abounded and potentially meritorious claims were sold off to the
lowest bidder via a cheap settlement.46 This was a “great game,” indeed—a dynamic
that Chief Justice Strine recently referred to as “stinky-as-cheese.”47
Cain and Solomon’s working paper quickly became a minor sensation,48
prompting articles in the mainstream press calling attention to the problem of
merger litigation.49 It was also referenced in a parade of publications by prominent
M&A law firms50 and was the centerpiece of a paper issued by the U.S. Chamber

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

A Great Game, supra note 4, at 115.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation,
66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1057–58 (2013).
46. As James Cox and Randall Thomas have observed, faced with the risks and costs of
litigation, risk-averse plaintiffs’ attorneys may be tempted to settle meritorious cases for too little. See
Cox and Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1593 (“[A] settlement offer
that provided recovery of the attorney’s tangible and opportunity costs could loom larger than the
prospect of aggressively pursuing the action to a more lucrative prospective judgment or settlement.”).
This incentive to settle quickly is exacerbated by the possibility that a duplicate claim brought in another
jurisdiction may result in a settlement and release, with the fee award going to another firm.
47. M&A Practice: In a New Age, supra note 19.
48. Or whatever the legal academia equivalent of a “sensation” is—it was not exactly
Beatlemania.
49. See, e.g., Allison Frankel, Must Read: Deal Prof’s Study of Competition for M&A Litigation,
REUTERS ( Jan. 17, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/01/17/must-read-dealprofs-study-of-competition-for-ma-litigation [ https://perma.cc/3YSW-AXKA ].
50. See, e.g., Adam O. Emmerich & Trevor S. Norwitz, An Antidote to Multiforum Shareholder
Litigation, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
2014 (8th ed.).
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of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform advocating for restrictions on merger
litigation, which it called a “merger tax” imposed by plaintiff’s lawyers.51
Understandably, these critics focused on the most obvious problem revealed by
Cain and Solomon’s data—the manifest proliferation of nuisance litigation. The
Chamber of Commerce paper, which is characteristic of the criticism, argued that
recent merger litigation represented “extortion through litigation,” threatening to
“obstruct[ ] economically beneficial transactions,” and demanded Congressional
action.52 With a few notable exceptions,53 the second problem suggested by the
data—that meritorious claims were buried in the avalanche of nuisance claims and
settled cheaply rather than being litigated diligently—was rarely a focus.54
By the time a subsequent study found that the additional disclosures resulting
from merger litigation provided, on average, no meaningful benefit to
stockholders,55 Delaware courts had already begun openly questioning the value of
much of the merger litigation being filed, and commentators were arguing that
merger litigation was fundamentally broken.56 The ensuing judicial pushback is
described in the next Section.

51. See The Trial Lawyers’ New Merger Tax: Corporate Mergers and the Mega Million-Dollar
Litigation Toll on Our Economy, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Oct. 24, 2012), http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/the-trial-lawyers-new-merger-tax-corporate-mergers-andthe-mega-million-dollar-litigation-toll-on-our-economy [ https://perma.cc/KKZ5-DZU5 ].
52. Id. at 1.
53. See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 45; see also Joel E. Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposes
the Systemic Problem of Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 878 (2015) (warning that meritorious
cases may be settled too cheaply).
54. Post-Trulia developments suggest that this second dynamic (high-value claims being settled
and released too cheaply) may be at least as important as the first (low-value claims being settled for
nuisance value) in driving merger litigation. Around the same time as Trulia, the Delaware legislature
formally allowed corporations to enact forum-selection bylaws by simple board action. Such bylaws
could, for example, require any stockholder suit to be brought in Delaware. Post-Trulia, however,
defendants have not, for the most part, used forum-selection bylaws to block the migration of merger
litigation to non-Delaware jurisdictions. This suggests that defendants value the ability to secure the
kind of low-cost release of claims no longer tolerated in Delaware. See, e.g., William B. Chandler III &
Anthony A. Rickey, The Trouble with Trulia: Re-evaluating the Case for Fee-Shifting Bylaws as a
Solution to the Overlitigation of Corporate Claims (Apr. 4, 2017) (working paper); Sean J. Griffith,
Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection
Provisions Can’t 2 (Fordham Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2855950) (noting that “defense
counsel must be seen as complicit in the out-of-Delaware dynamic because they have failed to exercise
Exclusive Forum bylaws to bring the litigation back to Delaware.”).
55. See Fisch et al., supra note 4. (finding that, on average, additional disclosures from such
settlements had no discernible effect of subsequent stockholder voting and concluding that these
settlements were of no value).
56. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound,
40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 851, 852 (2016) (referring to deal litigation as a “problem [that] has reached crisis
proportions”); Marc Wolinsky & Ben Schireson, Deal Litigation Run Amok: Diagnosis and Prescriptions,
47 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 1, 1 (Jan 8, 2014) (arguing that “the system is broken, that shareholder
suits are being filed regardless of the merits, and that shareholder plaintiffs are imposing a dead weight
on society”).
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II. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE MERGER LITIGATION BOOM
The Delaware judiciary’s response to the merger litigation boom has consisted
of two prongs, which have each developed over a period of years, largely
independent of one another. First, in a series of cases culminating in Trulia, the
Court of Chancery has gradually imposed greater scrutiny on merger litigation
settlements, ultimately refusing to approve settlements that do not provide clear
benefits to stockholders. Second, in a series of cases culminating in Corwin, the
Delaware Supreme Court has weakened substantive scrutiny of directors’
merger-related decisions, providing a deferential business judgment rule standard of
review where certain procedural safeguards are in place. These judicial
developments are summarized in this Section.
A. The Road to Trulia
Because merger class actions are representative suits, the court must approve
settlements.57 As a result, it has always been possible for a presiding judge to reject
the kind of low-value or collusive settlements that fueled the merger boom. And, in
fact, Delaware judges have for years complained about and criticized the merger
litigation settlements that have come before them.58 The judges’ comments at
settlement hearings suggest they were well aware of the pathologies developing in
merger litigation well before they had been fully documented in academic
scholarship.

57. See, e.g., In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. S’holder Litig., WL 2438067, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 21,
2015) (concluding that the potential divergence between the personal interests of the attorneys
conducting the litigation and the interests of the class or corporation they represent means that “the
Court of Chancery must . . . play the role of fiduciary in its review of these settlements.” (quoting In re
Resorts Int’l S’holders Litig. Appeals, 570 A.2d 259, 266 (Del. 1990))); In re Nat’l City Corp. S’holders
Litig., C.A. No. 4123-CC, 2009 WL 2425389, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2009) (“The Delaware Supreme
Court has unequivocally held that, where plaintiffs and defendants agree upon fees in settlement of a
class action lawsuit, a trial court ‘must make an independent determination of reasonableness’ of the
agreed to fees.” (quoting Goodrich v. E.F. Button Grp., Inc., 681 A.2d 1039, 1045–46 (Del. 1996))).
58. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 33, Roffe v. Eagle Rock Energy GP, L.P.,
C.A. 5258-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (likening settlements providing a release of claims in exchange
for additional disclosures to “using [the] Court to facilitate the sale of indulgences, . . . excusing the
defendants from any of their actual or potential sins.”); Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference at
19, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology, C.A. No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010) (explaining that
“plaintiffs’ lawyers have been subjected to criticism for the practice of suing on the announcement of
every deal, then agreeing to global disclosure statements. I’ve criticized you all for it. My colleagues have
criticized you all for it.”); Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 14, In re Monogram Biosciences,
Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 4703-CC (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2010) (noting the “continuing pattern of
people just challenging deals, basically raising sort of increasingly marginal disclosure claims . . . [a]nd
then . . . settl[ing] at the original price”); Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 25, Smith v. Curagen Corp.,
C.A. No. 4670-VCS (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2009) (noting the pattern of low-value merger litigation and
concluding that “[t]he incentive system that that creates is not, in my view, wholesome”).
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Nonetheless, until very recently the Court of Chancery was hesitant to reject
settlements that all parties appearing before the court favored,59 even when the
perverse incentives fostered by such settlements were fairly clear.60 As of 2013, a
researcher was able to find “only a few instances where the Court refused to
approve a disclosure-only settlement.”61 Instead of rejecting settlements outright,
the typical pattern was for the judge to grumble about the low-value relief and broad
release, but nonetheless approve the settlement after awarding the plaintiffs’
attorneys somewhat lower fees than requested.62
Only in 2015 did the Court of Chancery begin to take decisive action to change
the settlement dynamic in merger litigation. In September of that year, Vice
Chancellor Glasscock was faced with approving or rejecting a disclosure-only
settlement resolving litigation challenging the acquisition of Riverbed Technology.63
The Vice Chancellor initially followed the traditional pattern. He characterized the
benefit to the class as “a peppercorn, a positive result of small therapeutic value,”
and noted that “the breadth of the release is troubling.”64 Nonetheless, he ultimately
approved the settlement—after knocking the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ award down to
$300,000 from a requested $500,000. In this regard, the case resembled so many
that went before it. Glasscock then, however, fired a shot across the bow of merger
litigants. First, he emphasized that he was only approving the settlement because
the parties had clearly proceeded in “reasonable reliance . . . on formerly settled
practice in this Court.”65 The Vice Chancellor, however, then put litigants on notice
that they should not do so going forward. He noted “that this [reliance]
factor . . . will be diminished or eliminated going forward in light of this

59. As Henry Friendly remarked, “[o]nce a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff
stockholders link arms with their former adversaries to defend [their] joint handiwork.” Alleghany
Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting).
60. See Transcript of Motion for Class Certification, Settlement and Attorneys’ Fees and the
Court’s Ruling at 37, Becker v. Am. Commercial Lines Inc., C.A. No. 5919-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 9,
2011) (“Historically, we have tried to err on the side of allowing defendants to dispose of weak cases
by entering into [disclosure only] settlements like this. I think, certainly, the Chancellor [Strine] and I
have commented on the potentially bad incentives that that creates systemically in terms of encouraging
people to file suit on these types of actions and in terms of allowing defendants to obtain broad releases
in these types of actions.”).
61. See Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The Delaware Court of Chancery’s
Answer to Incentivizing Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 669, 675 n.22 (2013). Sumpter
cites only two such cases. See In re SS & C Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 911 A.2d 816 (Del. Ch. 2006);
In re FLS Holdings, Inc. S’holders Litig., 1993 WL 104562 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 1993). In both cases, the
settlements were rejected, in part, for failure to demonstrate diligent investigation of potentially
meritorious claims.
62. See Sumpter, supra note 61, at 704–28 (describing the dynamics behind fee awards in merger
litigation).
63. See In re Riverbed Tech., Inc., S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG (Del. Ch. Sept. 17,
2015).
64. Id. at *5–6.
65. Id. at *6.
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Memorandum Opinion and other decisions of this Court.”66 In doing so, he
indicated that what was “formerly settled practice” was not likely to remain so in
the future.
Only three weeks later, Vice Chancellor Laster went a step further, actually
rejecting a proposed settlement of litigation arising out of the acquisition of Aruba
Networks by Hewlett-Packard, and then dismissing the case entirely on grounds of
inadequate representation of counsel.67 Again, the Vice Chancellor criticized the
pairing of minimally useful disclosure for stockholders and broad global releases of
liability for defendants.68
By this point, it was clear that something had to give, and the final step came
in January of 2016, in the form of Chancellor Bouchard’s decision in Trulia. In it,
the Chancellor fingered the courts’ practice of approving disclosure-only
settlements as one of the driving “dynamics that ha[s] fueled disclosure settlements
of deal litigation”69 and announced an intent to put an end to these dynamics by
applying greater scrutiny to such settlements going forward. Bouchard cautioned
attorneys to “expect that disclosure settlements are likely to be met with continued
disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material
misrepresentation or omission.”70 He emphasized that by “plainly material,” he
meant “that it should not be a close call.”71 Bouchard also emphasized that
settlements would not be approved unless “the subject matter of the proposed
release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing more than the disclosure
claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning the sale process, if the record shows
that such claims have been investigated sufficiently.”72
B. The Road to Corwin
The Delaware courts have spent much of the past few decades slowly
retreating from the intensified scrutiny of merger-related decisions promised by
seminal 1980s cases like Weinberger, Unocal, Van Gorkom, and Revlon.73

66. Id. (citing In re Susser Holdings Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 9613-VCG
(Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2015); Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., C.A. No. 9730-VCL (Del. Ch. July 8,
2015); In re Intermune, Inc., S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10086-VCN (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015)).
67. In re Aruba Networks, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015).
68. Vice Chancellor Laster suggested that the type of “reliance interest in past practice” that
may have applied in Riverbed did not apply, given his own prior record of aggressively questioning
disclosure-only settlements accompanied by broad releases. Id.
69. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del. Ch. 2016).
70. Id. at 898.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Rise and Fall, supra note 5, at 5 (“[T]he courts gradually backed away from the
interventionist approach and new standards of the 1980s. The result over a 25-year period spanning
from the 1990s until today are clear, a wholesale change in the application and use of these standards.”).
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Unocal was the first to be scaled back by the judiciary.74 As originally
conceived, Unocal doctrine promised substantial scrutiny of management’s use of
defensive tactics in the face of a hostile bid, requiring the board to demonstrate 1)
that the hostile bid presented a threat to the corporation and 2) that the defensive
measures were reasonable and proportionate to that threat.75 As applied, however,
these two prongs have become increasingly easy for boards to satisfy. First, in
Paramount Communications Co. v. Time, Inc.,76 the Delaware Supreme Court
recognized “substantive coercion” as a justification for defensive action, ensuring
that boards could easily satisfy the first requirement of Unocal by simply declaring
the hostile offer inadequate.77 The second prong of Unocal was also later weakened,
most prominently in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., which adopted a
deferential approach to assessing proportionality.78 By 2001, Professors Gordon
Smith and Robert Thompson could survey the relevant case law and judged that
Unocal was “a dead letter.”79 This judgment was vindicated in 2011, when
Chancellor Chandler (reluctantly) refused to order redemption of a poison pill even
in the face of a hostile offer that stockholders manifestly and reasonably regarded
as fair.80
The Revlon doctrine, too, has become notably weaker over time, most
prominently in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan.81 In Revlon itself, the Delaware
Supreme Court applied Unocal’s “enhanced scrutiny” to the target board’s efforts
to get “the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company,”82 with a focus
74. Van Gorkom, of course, was met by rapid legislative action in the form of Sec. 102(b)(7),
allowing corporations to adopt charter provisions exculpating directors from monetary liability for
breaches of the duty of care. Virtually all public corporations have adopted such provisions. See
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 490, 497–503 (2000)
(finding that ninety-eight out of a sample of 100 Fortune 500 companies had adopted such provisions,
including all fifty-nine Delaware-incorporated companies in the sample).
75. See Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
76. Paramount Commc’ns Co. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
77. See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder
Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 291 (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court
sanctioned the use of defensive mechanisms in the face of an offer at a price perceived to be inadequate.
By approving substantive coercion as a rationale for defensive action, the court ensured that directors
would always carry their burden of proof on the first prong of the Unocal framework.”).
78. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). In Unitrin, the court held that
defensive measures would be found to be proportionate unless they were 1) coercive or preclusive, or
2) outside the range of reasonableness. Id. at 1386–88. In practice, defensive measures have been found
proportionate under Unitrin unless they render even a proxy contest essentially impossible. See
Thompson & Smith, supra note 77, at 286 (referring to Unocal as “a dead letter” in the wake of Unitrin).
79. See Thompson & Smith, supra note 77, at 286.
80. See Air Prod. and Chems. Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). In defense of the
target board’s actions, it should be noted that their strategy proved successful, with the company
ultimately being acquired in 2016 for more than twice the amount of the hostile offer. See Leslie Picker,
Why Airgas Was Finally Sold, for $10 Billion Instead of $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/business/dealbook/why-airgas-was-finally-sold-for-10billion-instead-of-5-billion.html [ https://perma.cc/D77B-HDAP ].
81. Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
82. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985).
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on the “reasonableness and purpose” of the board’s actions.83 While Lyondell
retained Revlon’s language of “enhanced scrutiny” and “reasonableness,” the court
examined the challenged conduct through a lens of good faith, emphasizing that it
would not second guess the reasoned judgment of the board even in the pre-closing
period.84
It is the weakening of Weinberger, however, that led most directly to MFW,
and then Corwin. The Weinberger court applied an entire fairness standard to a
controlling stockholder squeeze-out, requiring the defendant directors to
demonstrate that the transaction was entirely fair to minority stockholders.85 Entire
fairness review makes it difficult to dispose of a claim early in the process, and
dealmakers have long searched for procedural safe harbors to gain more deferential
review, even before the twenty-first century boom in merger litigation. This effort
bore early fruit in 1985 in Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil, where the court held that “approval
of a merger, as here, by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders,
while not a legal prerequisite, shifts the burden of proving the unfairness of the
merger entirely to the plaintiffs.”86 This principle was extended again in 1994 in
Kahn v. Lynch,87 where the court additionally allowed the burden to be shifted to the
plaintiffs if an empowered committee of independent directors approved the
transaction.88
Though the Lynch court was not confronted with a scenario where both
safeguards were in place, it nowhere acknowledged the possibility of anything other
than entire fairness as a standard of review. Indeed, the Lynch court referred to the
“policy rationale which requires judicial review of interested cash-out mergers
exclusively for entire fairness.”89 Ultimately, while Rosenblatt and Lynch’s shifting the
burden of proof to the plaintiffs was certainly a benefit to defendants, it did little to
alter the fundamental litigation dynamics. Even with the burden of proof on the
plaintiffs, the application of entire fairness made claims difficult to dispose of early,
allowing plaintiffs to impose substantial discovery costs and giving even frivolous
suits substantial settlement value.90

83. Id. at 180.
84. See Rise and Fall, supra note 5, at 6 (“Once again, the court had removed itself from a more
searching scrutiny, instead preferring in this instance to subsume Revlon within the general fiduciary
duty of loyalty and its standard of good faith.”); Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon,
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 209 (2014) (“Both the actual words and the clear ‘music’ of the Lyondell
opinion imposed a demanding liability standard for challenging director conduct in the Revlon setting.”).
85. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“The requirement of fairness
is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of
establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”).
86. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil, 493 A.2d 929, 929 (1985).
87. Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1117.
90. See In re MFW S’holders Litig. , 67 A.3d 496, 534 (“[A]bsent the ability of defendants to
bring an effective motion to dismiss, every case has settlement value, not for merits reasons, but because
the cost of paying an attorneys’ fee to settle litigation and obtain a release . . . exceeds the cost in terms

First to Printer_Korsmo (Do Not Delete)

2019]

DELAWARE’S RETREAT

10/29/2019 1:34 PM

71

Over the past two decades, the Delaware courts have gradually expanded the
availability of such safe harbors. Initially this took place in the context of tender
offers, partly on the grounds the board had less of a gatekeeping function in tender
offers.91 Eventually, however, the Court of Chancery questioned the wisdom of
applying two different standards in the functionally similar tender offer and
statutory merger contexts.92
In a series of opinions, the Court of Chancery sought to harmonize the law of
squeeze-outs by building on the framework created by Lynch. Instead of simply
shifting the burden of proof for adopting one of two procedural safeguards—and
providing no additional incentive to adopt both safeguards—the Court of Chancery
began arguing for full business judgment rule deference to squeeze-outs where a
controlling stockholder agreed to have their offer conditioned on approval by both
an independent committee and a majority of the minority stockholder vote. This
standard was put forward initially in pure dicta in Cox Communications.93 It was
subsequently employed in several cases but not found to apply under the facts of
those cases.94
This line of case law finally culminated in MFW. In MFW, the controlling
stockholder of MFW took the company private via a squeeze-out merger.95 The
controller, however, had stipulated at the beginning of negotiations that it would
“not move forward with the transaction unless it [was] approved by . . . a special
committee” of independent directors.96 The controller also specified at the outset
that the squeeze-out would be “subject to a non-waivable condition requiring the
approval of a majority of the” minority shares.97
In MFW, then-Chancellor Strine first noted that Lynch had not confronted a
situation involving both an independent committee and a majority of the minority
condition.98 Chancellor Strine then engaged in a wide-ranging analysis of the

of dollars and time consumed of going through the discovery process under a standard of review in
which a substantive review of financial fairness is supposedly inescapable.”).
91. See, e.g., In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787
(Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
92. See, e.g., In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig. 836 A.2d 531, 547 (Del. Ch. 2003) (referring to the
disparity in treatment as “passing strange”); In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 435
(Del. Ch. 2002) (noting the potential incoherence of treating economically similar transactions
differently).
93. See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 606 (Del. Ch. 2005).
94. See, e.g., In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 400 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re John
Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 758-CC, 2009 WL 3165613, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009).
95. MFW, 67 A.3d at 499.
96. Id. at 506.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 522 (“[T]he Supreme Court was only asked to determine what the standard of review
was when a merger was approved by a special committee, not by a special committee and a non-waivable
majority-of-the-minority vote.”). Strine admitted that “there is broad language in [Lynch and other
precedents] that can be read to control the question,” but concluded that the “question remains an
open one.” Id. at 524.
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relevant policy considerations at play in deciding the proper standard of review.99 I
evaluate these considerations more fully in the next two Sections. In short, however,
Strine concluded that a structure featuring both protections “replicates the
arm’s-length merger . . . by ‘requir[ing] two independent approvals, which it is fair
to say serve independent integrity-enforcing functions.’”100 As a result, the business
judgment rule would be invoked if the controller conditioned the transaction on
approval of both an empowered, independent special committee and a majority of
the minority, where there is no inference that the committee failed to meet its duty
of care or that the stockholders were uninformed or coerced.101 Amid some
suspense, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed MFW, treating the issue as one of
first impression and largely adopting the Chancellor’s reasoning.102
With MFW settled, the treatment of mergers not involving a controlling
stockholder was largely a fait accompli.103 If the business judgment rule applied when
a controlling stockholder squeeze-out mimicked the trappings of a third-party deal,
then surely it would also apply to an actual third-party deal.104 The predictable result
came the next year in Corwin, which, in comparison to MFW, is a fairly brief and
cursory opinion. Corwin involved the acquisition of KKR Financial Holdings by
KKR in a stock-for-stock merger.105 The transaction was approved by a stockholder
vote.106 While the plaintiffs alleged that KKR functioned as a controller despite its
small stock holdings, the Court of Chancery found that the target board was
independent, and the Supreme Court found no reason to disagree.107
In the lower court, the primary dispute (other than the question of whether
KKR should be treated as a controlling stockholder) was over whether Revlon was
triggered by the stock-for-stock merger and enhanced scrutiny thereby applied.108
The Supreme Court, however, found that Revlon was irrelevant because the
informed stockholder vote in favor of the merger invoked the business judgment
rule as the appropriate standard of review, insulating against anything but a claim

99.
Id. at 524–36.
100. Id. at 528 (quoting Cox, 879 A.2d at 618).
101. Id. at 535. Chancellor Strine noted that dissenting stockholders could still challenge the
price via an appraisal action. Id.
102. See generally Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
103. Indeed, Vice Chancellor Laster suggested in a 2014 article, shortly after MFW, that “[a]s a
matter of first principles, in a situation where enhanced scrutiny applies, stockholder approval by a
disinterested, uncoerced, and fully informed stockholder majority should restore the business judgment
rule.” Laster, supra note 22, at 1444.
104. It is worth noting that the result in MFW begs the question of the proper standard of
review in post-closing damages actions for third-party deals. If the proper standard for a third-party
deal were Revlon-style enhanced scrutiny, the MFW court should have imposed that standard rather
than the business judgment rule in exchange for adopting the procedural trappings of a third-party deal.
105. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306 (Del. 2015).
106. In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 988–89 (Del. Ch. 2014).
107. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 307–08.
108. Id. at 308; see also Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 (Del. 2016) (clarifying that
plaintiffs can only challenge such a transaction on the basis that it constitutes waste).
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for waste.109 Thus, the court concluded that approval by an “uncoerced, informed
stockholder vote is outcome-determinative, even if Revlon applied to the merger.”110
Because the transaction was not coercive, and because the plaintiffs did not allege
that the stockholder vote was uninformed, the business judgment rule applied, and
the case was at an end.
Following Corwin, it is now clear that a transaction “not subject to the entire
fairness standard” will be reviewed under the business judgment rule standard for
the purposes of a post-closing damages action “when the disinterested stockholders
have had the free and informed chance to decide on the economic merits of a
transaction for themselves.”111 Corwin has since been extended to apply to two-stage
mergers under 251(h).112 As a result, the prospects of succeeding in a post-closing
damages action are now exceedingly dim. The only plausible path to liability—or
even discovery—is via allegations of disclosure violations. 113 For reasons discussed
below, however, this is rarely a promising approach.
III. THE RATIONALES FOR MFW AND CORWIN
In the previous Section, I introduced the holdings of Trulia, MFW, and
Corwin. Trulia has largely been welcomed as providing long-overdue adult
supervision to the disclosure-only settlements that drove the merger boom.114 It
manifestly blocks low-value merger litigation without foreclosing the possibility of
high-value suits. While many have noted that Trulia, standing alone, is not a
109. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 306.
110. Id. at 308.
111. Id. at 312–13.
112. In re Volcano Corp. S’holder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 741 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Stockholder
acceptance of a tender offer pursuant to a Section 251(h) merger has the same cleansing effect as a
stockholder vote in favor of a transaction.”).
113. The ability to bring a waste claim is largely illusory, given that a claim that informed,
uncoerced stockholders approved a wasteful transaction will generally be implausible on its face. See
Singh, 137 A.3d at 153 (noting that “the vestigial waste exception has long had little real-world relevance,
because it has been understood that stockholders would be unlikely to approve a transaction that is
wasteful”) (internal citations omitted).
114. See, e.g., Chandler III & Rickey, supra note 54, at 1 (noting that Trulia was “widely seen as
a promising corrective to the problem of excessive corporate litigation”). Commentators had long called
for greater judicial policing of collusive settlements, while noting that litigation dynamics made such
policing unlikely. See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 46, at 1594 (“[T]he presiding judge, overwhelmed
by a crowded docket and poorly armed against the possible self-interest of the attorneys who promoted
the suit’s settlement, was not capable of effectively protecting the interests of the class.”); Korsmo &
Myers, supra note 4, at 842 (“In practice . . . a busy judge is understandably reluctant to reject a settlement
that all parties before the court are pressing the court to accept.”). Cox and Thomas did note, however,
that judges already possessed the necessary tools to police stockholder litigation, even if they did not
always have the incentives to use them. Id. The Delaware State Bar Association evidently agreed. When
tasked with making a recommendation on whether to allow corporations to adopt bylaws forcing
plaintiffs to bear the corporation’s litigation costs for an unsuccessful suit, they recommended not
allowing such bylaws, at least partly because the problem of excessive stockholder litigation could be
adequately controlled by “increase[d] judicial confidence to use the tools available to supervise
stockholder litigation more effectively.” DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF
COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 9 (2015).
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panacea,115 I am unaware of any serious criticism of the decision itself, or the
standard it announced for approving settlements.
MFW and Corwin, while still largely welcomed, are not as self-evidently
positive developments.116 Certainly the decisions have occasioned some gnashing
of teeth among the Delaware plaintiff’s bar. Indeed, in the next Section, I will
conclude that a little teeth-gnashing is appropriate—MFW and Corwin are likely to
do more harm than good.117 Preparatory to this criticism, it is necessary to consider
in more detail the justifications proffered for the holdings, both in the opinions
themselves and by supporters of their outcome.
While the two cases obviously address somewhat different situations, they
involve overlapping justifications. These justifications fall into eight major
categories, which also unavoidably overlap somewhat. First, that Corwin does not
represent a change at all but is simply an application of longstanding principle.
Second, relatedly, that the enhanced scrutiny of Revlon and Unocal was never
intended to apply to post-closing claims. Third, that deferring to informed directors
and stockholders is in keeping with the core reasoning underlying the business
judgment rule. Fourth, that boards and stockholders have less need for judicial
scrutiny due to the increasing prevalence of independent directors and institutional
investors. Fifth, that MFW creates an incentive for controlling stockholders to
employ beneficial procedural protections. Sixth, that the cleansing power of a
stockholder vote is an application of general principles of ratification. Seventh, that
dissenters can still avail themselves of the appraisal remedy. Eighth, that merger
litigation does not provide any substantial benefits in the first place.
I introduce each of these justifications briefly in this Section and critique each
of them in the next.

115. The main concern is that Trulia can be evaded by filing the merger challenge outside of
Delaware, in jurisdictions still willing to approve disclosure-only settlements. See, e.g., Chandler III &
Rickey, supra note 54, at 2 (“Although Delaware courts have acted to rein in disclosure settlements, few
courts in other jurisdictions have followed suit.”); Griffith, supra note 54, at 2 (documenting the
migration of merger litigation to non-Delaware jurisdictions and concluding that hopes that Trulia had
solved the merger litigation problem once and for all “now appear to have been wishful thinking”).
116. See, e.g., Daniel Wilson, Desirable Resistance: Kahn v. M&F Worldwide and the Fight for the
Business Judgment Rule in Going-Private Mergers, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 643, 644 (2015) (characterizing
Chancellor Strine’s decision in MFW as “controversial”).
117. See infra Part IV.
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A. That “Old-Time Religion”
The first and most straightforward defense of Corwin is that it is simply a
continuation of long-standing Delaware practice, and not a change in the law at
all.118 Chief Justice Strine, the author of the Corwin opinion, has been particularly
adamant on this point. At a 2017 conference, he implored those alarmed by Corwin
to “read the old law—the old time religion” and noted that “[i]f you read the
footnote in Corwin, where there’s 57 prior cases cited, there’s nothing new about
this.”119 While fifty-seven is a bit of hyperbole, it is certainly the case that both the
Supreme Court and Chancery opinions cite a large number of cases, including such
well-known warhorses as Wheelabrator120 and Stroud v. Grace.121
Indeed, the footnote to which Strine was referring cites no fewer than sixteen
cases—stretching back as far as 1928—for varying versions of the broad
proposition that stockholder approval of an action or transaction can result in
business judgment rule deference.122 For good measure, the footnote also throws in
a cite to an article by former Chancellor William Allen (now counsel at Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz) for the more specific contention that “a fully informed
majority vote of the disinterested stockholders that approves a transaction (other
than a merger with a controlling stockholder) has the effect of insulating the
directors from all claims except waste.”123
B. Enhanced Scrutiny Intended Only for Pre-Closing Claims
An extension of the argument that Corwin does not represent a change in the
law is that Unocal and Revlon never called for enhanced scrutiny in a post-closing
damages action, following stockholder approval of a merger. Then-Chancellor
Strine strongly implied this in his MFW opinion, arguing that, under Unocal and
Revlon, “when arm’s-length cash mergers were approved by fully informed,
uncoerced votes of the disinterested stockholders, the business judgment rule
standard of review was applied to any class-action claim for monetary relief based
on the inadequacy of the merger price.”124
This conclusion was restated more explicitly in the Supreme Court’s Corwin
opinion, which concluded that “Unocal and Revlon are primarily designed to give

118. The same, of course, cannot be said of MFW, which both the Court of Chancery and the
Supreme Court treated as a matter of first impression, and where both acknowledged the potential
tension with prior case law. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 524 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(“Admittedly, there is broad language in [earlier cases] that can be read to control the question asked in
this case.”); Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. 2014) (noting that “[t]his appeal
presents a question of first impression”).
119. M&A Practice: In a New Age, supra note 19, at 4 5 (2017).
120. In re Wheelabrator Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995).
121. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).
122. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 310 n.19 (Del. 2015).
123. Id. (quoting William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1317–18 (2001)).
124. MFW, 67 A.3d at 527.
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stockholders and the Court of Chancery the tool of injunctive relief to address
important M&A decisions in real time, before closing. They were not tools designed
with post-closing money damages claims in mind.”125 Indeed, virtually all of the
landmark merger cases under Revlon and Unocal involve a rival bidder as the plaintiff,
not stockholders. Furthermore, these cases do not involve challenges to the merger
price but rather to defensive measures intended to ward off a hostile bid or steer
the target company into the arms of a favored acquirer.126
Under this view, enhanced scrutiny is intended to provide the Court of
Chancery with a tool to police self-serving actions by the target board that may tend
to entrench them or otherwise hamper a robust auction dynamic. The implication
of this argument is that even with post-closing damages foreclosed by business
judgment rule deference, pre-closing challenges by rival bidders (or, presumably,
stockholders) can adequately police managerial misconduct surrounding mergers.
C. The Business Judgment Rule
Another justification—perhaps the paramount one—for Corwin and MFW is
that deference under such circumstances is in keeping with the underlying rationale
for the business judgment rule. As Vice Chancellor Laster summarized Delaware’s
approach to the business judgment rule, “a court applying Delaware law searches
for an independent, disinterested, and sufficiently informed decision maker. If one
exists, then the court defers to the decision that the qualified decision maker made.
Only in the absence of a qualified decision maker will the court assume that role for
itself.”127
The Corwin court concluded that independent directors and stockholders
constitute such qualified decision makers for the purposes of approving a merger.
As a result, it argued that its reasons for deference were “tied to the core rationale
of the business judgment rule, which is that judges are poorly positioned to evaluate
the wisdom of business decisions and there is little utility to having them
second-guess the determination of impartial decision-makers with more
information (in the case of directors) or an actual economic stake in the outcome
(in the case of informed, disinterested stockholders).”128

125. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312.
126. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 919 (Del. 2003) (challenge
by thwarted bidder seeking to invalidate deal protections granted to rival bidder); Paramount
Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36 (Del. 1994) (challenge by hostile bidder seeking
to invalidate deal protections granted to rival bidder); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571
A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1990) (challenge by hostile bidder seeking to enjoin efforts to steer target into
alternative transaction); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178
(Del. 1985) (challenge by rival bidder seeking to nullify deal protections granted to favored acquirer);
Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (challenge by hostile bidder seeking
to enjoin defensive self-tender).
127. Laster, supra note 22, at 1443.
128. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 313–14; see also MFW, 67 A.3d at 502 (“This conclusion is consistent
with the central tradition of Delaware law, which defers to the informed decisions of impartial directors,
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D. Independent Directors and Institutional Stockholders
The argument that directors and stockholders could be treated as qualified
decision-makers to whom deference should be accorded under the business
judgment rule is arguably bolstered by changes in board composition and patterns
of stockholding over the past several decades. As Professors Solomon and Thomas
recently noted, “the rise of independent directors and institutional investors had
provided Delaware courts with alternative monitoring mechanisms” and, as a result
“the view changed that judges were necessary to police this market as the courts
recognized other private mechanisms.”129
The prevalence of independent directors is, indeed, far greater than it was at
the time the initial Delaware merger cases were decided.130 In 1970, a clear majority
of large-company directors were insiders, with only approximately 20% plausibly
characterized as independent.131 By the 1980s, while inside directors were still not
uncommon, they were typically outnumbered by independent directors.132 By the
turn of the century, it was rare for a public company board to contain a majority of
insiders, in part due to changes in NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements.133
The trend ultimately became law as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act134 and Dodd-Frank
Act135 mandated independent majorities on public company boards of directors, as
well as audit committees consisting wholly of independent directors. A clear
majority of S&P 500 firms now have only a single non-independent director,
typically the company’s CEO.136
In theory, the increasing dominance of independent directors could serve to
mitigate what Unocal called the “omnipresent specter” that the board would yield to

especially when those decisions have been approved by the disinterested stockholders on full
information and without coercion.”).
129. Solomon & Thomas, supra note 5, at 7–8.
130. See Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 92 N.C. L. REV. 855, 864
(2014) (“The number of insiders sitting on corporate boards declined steadily from the mid-1970s and
fell precipitously towards the end of the century.”).
131. See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of
Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 113 (1985).
132. See Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Determinants of Board Composition,
19 RAND J. ECON. 589 (1988); Velkonja, supra note 130, at 863 (“Most public companies have
maintained a majority independent board since at least the late 1980s.”).
133. See Ran Duchin, John G. Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas, When Are Outside Directors
Effective?, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 196 (2010). Writing in 2002, Professors Bhagat and Black could write
that “[t]oday, almost all [boards] have a majority (usually a large majority) of outside directors, most
have a majority (often a large majority) of independent directors, and an increasing number have only
one or two inside directors.” Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 232 (2002).
134. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
135. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
136. See Velikonja, supra note 130, at 864 (noting that in 1986, only 3% of S&P 500 firms had
only one inside director, and that the figure had risen to 23% in 1997 and 60% in 2013).
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conflicts of interest in the merger context.137 This is both because independent
directors will typically have less of an interest in entrenchment and change-ofcontrol payments and because they will often be constrained by countervailing
reputational interests.138
The rise of independent directors has been mirrored by a rise in institutional
investors. In 1950, the vast majority of public company shares were held by
individuals, with only about 6% of U.S. equities held by institutional investors—
including mutual funds, pension funds, and other investment funds and financial
institutions.139 By 1980, institutional ownership had crossed 25%140 and has now
risen past 80% of the equity value of the S&P 500.141 A number of these institutional
investors are so-called “activist funds” that seek to take an active role in shaping
corporate policy.
As far back as 1994, the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that the increasing
prevalence of institutional investors created a potential check on managerial
opportunism.142 In his MFW opinion, then-Chancellor Strine emphasized that
“[m]arket developments in the score of years since have made it far easier, not
harder, for stockholders to protect themselves,”143 pointing to increased
institutional ownership144 and better availability of information.145 After noting the
willingness of stockholders to buck management initiatives,146 the court concluded

137. See Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); Solomon &
Thomas, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that “boards were now comprised of a majority of independent
directors who presumably were more willing to serve as a check against conflicted management
responses”).
138. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 528–29 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The Supreme Court
has held that independent directors are presumed to be motivated to do their duty with fidelity, like
most other people, and has also observed that directors have a more self-protective interest in retaining
their reputations as faithful, diligent fiduciaries.”). The MFW court went on to emphasize that this
reputational interest is especially strong “in a market where many independent directors serve on several
boards, and where institutional investors and their voting advisors, such as ISS and Glass Lewis, have
computer-aided memory banks available to remind them of the past record of directors . . . .” Id. at 529.
139. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 874 (2013); Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value
and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1568 (2007).
140. Gordon, supra note 139, at 1568.
141. See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2016)
(“[I]nstitutional investors like BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity, and State Street now own around 80% of
all stock in S&P 500 corporations.”).
142. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1382 (Del. 1995) (“Institutions are more
likely than other shareholders to vote at all [and] more likely to vote against manager proposals.”).
143. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 530 (Del. Ch. 2013).
144. Id. (noting that “institutional investor holdings have only grown since 1994, making it
easier for a blocking position of minority investors to be assembled”).
145. Id. (“With the development of the internet, there is more public information than ever
about various commentators’, analysts’, institutional investors’, journalists’ and others’ views about the
wisdom of transactions.”).
146. Id. at 531 (“Stockholders have mounted more proxy fights, and, as important, wielded the
threat of a proxy fight or a ‘withhold vote’ campaign to secure changes in both corporate policies and
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that “[g]iven the evident and growing power of modern stockholders, there seems
to be little basis to doubt the fairness-assuring effectiveness of an upfront
majority-of-the-minority vote condition.”147 While the Corwin court did not
mention these considerations, the same logic would necessarily apply to a
stockholder vote in an uncontrolled company.148
E. Positive Incentive Effects
Central to the holding in MFW was the desire to give controllers “a strong
incentive for the wide employment of a transactional structure highly beneficial to
minority investors.”149 Under Lynch, a controlling stockholder could shift the
burden of proof on fairness by employing either an independent committee or a
majority-of-the-minority condition, but would receive no additional benefit from
employing both protections. As a result, the controlling stockholder had no
incentive to employ what most agreed was the optimal transactional structure for
freezeouts.150 By granting controlling stockholders the protections of the business
judgment rule in the presence of both safeguards, MFW provides a powerful
incentive to mimic the protections of an arm’s-length deal.151
F. Stockholder Vote as Ratification
Another intuitive defense of both MFW and Corwin is that both decisions are,
in broad strokes, consistent with general principles of stockholder ratification. Both
by statute and under the common law, an informed vote of the stockholders can
ratify—and thereby insulate from judicial review—even overtly self-dealing
transactions.152 On its face, or so the logic of Corwin suggests, a decision to accept

the composition of corporate boards. Stockholders have voted against mergers they did not find
favorable, or forced increases in price.”) (internal citations omitted).
147. Id. at 532.
148. See Solomon & Thomas, supra note 17, at 11 (“Hedge funds, empowered and backed by
institutional shareholders, could police misconduct and oppose, support or even instigate, takeovers.”).
149. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 536 (Del. Ch. 2013).
150. See id. at 501 (“For controlling stockholders who knew that they would get a burden shift
if they did one of the procedural protections, but who did not know if they would get any additional
benefit for taking the certain business risk of assenting to an additional and potent procedural
protection for the minority stockholders, the incentive to use both procedural devices and thus replicate
the key elements of the arm’s-length merger process was therefore minimal to downright
discouraging.”); see also Subramanian, supra note 16, at 16–17 (“With the burden thus shifted through a
well-functioning [special committee], controllers have no further incentive to provide a [majority-ofthe-minority] condition.”).
151. MFW, 67 A.3d at 535 (“Importantly, this incentive structure can be made even more
effective as an efficient and powerful way of ensuring fair treatment of the minority in going private
transactions.”); id. at 502-03 (“[T]he adoption of this rule will be of benefit to minority stockholders
because it will provide a strong incentive for controlling stockholders to accord minority investors the
transactional structure that respected scholars believe will provide them the best protection . . . .”)
(citing Gilson & Gordon, supra note 16, at 839–40; Subramanian, supra note 16, at 60–61).
152. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2019); In re Wheelabrator Inc., S’holders Litig.,
663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995).
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or reject a merger is no different, and a vote of approval should have a similar
ratifying effect.153
Indeed, as discussed more fully below, a large proportion of cases cited by the
Corwin court in support of its core holding are concerned more with stockholder
approval in general—of asset sales, charter amendments, executive compensation
packages, etc.—than with the specific question of stockholder approval of a merger.
The court noted that some of the cases involved full, formal ratification under
Delaware law, while others involved “ratification” in the more colloquial sense of
an approval that warrants a reduction in judicial scrutiny.154 The authority the Corwin
court sought to rely on, however, was “the critical reasoning of these
opinions . . . giving standard of review-invoking effect to a fully informed vote of
the disinterested stockholders.”155
G. Availability of Appraisal
Allowing stockholders to seek post-closing monetary damages in a merger
class action may also seem redundant, given the availability of the appraisal
remedy.156 The appraisal remedy already allows a dissenting stockholder to refuse
the merger consideration and instead file a special judicial proceeding where the
sole remedy available is the “fair value” of the dissenter’s shares.157 Given that fair
value is generally the remedy sought in a post-closing fiduciary duty class action, it
would arguably be more efficient to simply relegate all dissatisfied stockholders to
appraisal. Appraisal is already typically the exclusive remedy available for short-form
mergers, and Professor Myers and I have argued elsewhere that the merger class
action might profitably be eliminated in favor of a strengthened appraisal-like
remedy.158
In his opinion in MFW, and in several related opinions, then-Chancellor Strine
repeatedly references the continuing availability of appraisal as a judicial backstop
even where a fiduciary duty class action cannot go forward.159 While the Supreme
153. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313 (Del. 2015) (“When the real
parties in interest—the disinterested equity owners—can easily protect themselves at the ballot box by
simply voting no, the utility of a litigation-intrusive standard of review promises more costs to
stockholders in the form of litigation rents and inhibitions on risk-taking than it promises in terms of
benefits to them.”).
154. Id. at 310 n.19 (“In citing to these authorities, we note than many of them used the term
‘ratification’ in a looser sense than the clarified and narrow description that was given to that term in
the scholarly Gantler opinion.”).
155. Id.
156. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2019).
157. For a description of the appraisal remedy and its modern usage, see Charles R. Korsmo &
Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551
(2015).
158. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 25; see also Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The
Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829 (2014) (arguing
that litigation agency costs play a less pernicious role in appraisal litigation than in merger class actions).
159. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 503 (Del. Ch. 2013) (arguing that merger
litigation “promises more cost than benefit” and that this “is especially the case because stockholders
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Court’s Corwin opinion makes no reference to appraisal—it may be that Chief
Justice Strine has cooled somewhat on appraisal in the intervening years—the need
for post-closing damages actions for arm’s-length mergers is also attenuated if a
robust appraisal remedy is available. Indeed, some respected academic
commentators suggest that increased appraisal activity in recent years may be driven,
in part, by a migration of claims that once would have been filed as class actions.160
H. No Value from Merger Litigation
Perhaps the most ubiquitous justification for not allowing post-closing
damages actions to proceed is that such litigation provides no value in the first
place—or, at the very least, not enough value to justify the associated costs. The
evidence on this score was presented above, and the picture of merger litigation as
a sewer of nuisance litigation is evident in the case law.161 In MFW, for example,
the chancery court acknowledged that “[t]he loss from invoking the business
judgment rule standard of review is whatever residual value it provides to minority
investors to have the potential for judicial review of fairness.”162 Before
summarizing the unwholesome dynamics of merger litigation, however, the court
notes that “[t]he difficulty for the plaintiffs is that what evidence exists suggests that
the systemic benefits of the possibility of such review in cases like this are slim to
non-existent.”163
While the Corwin court denied that its decision represented a change in course,
it is difficult to understand the developments of the past decade without an
appreciation of the increasingly apparent failure of merger litigation. In describing
what they characterize as an overall scaling back of judicial scrutiny in the merger
context, Professors Davidoff and Thomas emphasize the mounting evidence that

who vote no, and do not wish to accept the merger consideration in a going private transaction despite
the other stockholders’ decision to support the merger, will typically have the right to seek appraisal”);
id. at 535 (“[A]ny minority stockholder who voted no on a going private merger where appraisal is
available, which is frequently the case, may also exercise her appraisal rights. Although appraisal is not
a cost-free remedy, institutional ownership concentration has made it an increasingly effective one, and
there are obvious examples of where it has been used effectively.”); see also In re Lear Corp. S’holders
Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting that stockholders who think the merger consideration is
insufficient “may vote no and seek appraisal”); In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975,
1023 (Del. Ch. 2005) (same).
160. See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 17 (suggesting that “substantive cutbacks” in fiduciary duty
law “may help explain a related development, the rapid increase in Delaware appraisal litigation”).
161. Sometimes the analogy to a sewer borders on explicit. In his remarks at Tulane in 2017,
Chief Justice Strine referred to the dynamics of merger litigation as “just skanky” and then, warming to
his theme, clarified that he did not mean “Bourbon Street when you’re having fun. It’s Bourbon Street
the next morning when the last thing you need to do is to smell something bad that just puts you over
the line that holds it together.” Gay Jervey et al, Strine Moments, 17 M&A J. 1, 3 (June 2017).
162. MFW, 67 A.3d at 534.
163. Id.; see also In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 606 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(arguing that private litigation driven by plaintiffs’ lawyers did not function effectively).
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merger litigation was not functioning properly.164 They also point to the almost
complete absence of injunctions or (especially) monetary payments to stockholders
as evidence that merger litigation had come to serve little purpose except as a vehicle
for legal fees and releases of liability.165 For any who would argue that something is
being lost by blocking the possibility of post-closing damages, the ready response is
to ask, “How can you miss something you never had?”
IV. MFW AND CORWIN REPRESENT AN UNWARRANTED WEAKENING OF
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF MERGERS
In the last Section, I introduced the main justifications for the results of MFW
and Corwin. No doubt others are possible, but the arguments listed convey the main
themes, and I have attempted to give them full and fair expression. Thus far, I have
withheld critical evaluation of the arguments, which is provided in this section. In
short, I find that most, if not all, of the arguments are substantially weaker than they
first appear.
A. Prior Precedent is Unclear at Best
MFW admittedly addressed a question of first impression, and thus
unavoidably created new law. The claim that Corwin was nothing new, however, is
a little harder to credit. Certainly after MFW held that a controller freeze-out would
receive business judgment rule deference if it mimicked the conditions of an
arm’s-length deal, it only stood to reason that an actual arm’s-length deal should
also receive the same deference. But it is far from clear that this has always been the
universal understanding. Instead, MFW may have stolen a march by awarding the
business judgment rule rather than enhanced scrutiny.
In part, the uncertainty in the case law is due to the scarcity of merger cases
proceeding all the way to a full written opinion. But case law prior to Corwin was, at
best, mixed. Indeed, just months prior to the Corwin decision, Vice Chancellor
Parsons was confronted with the same question as in Corwin and held that “where,
as here, the merger consideration paid to the target company’s stockholders is cash,
Revlon enhanced scrutiny applies, even after the merger has been approved by a fully
informed, disinterested majority of stockholders.”166 Even if Corwin was not the

164. See Solomon & Thomas, supra note 17, at 11 (“[B]y 2010 the costs of such regulation [by
litigation] were proving to be excessive due to widespread and admittedly frivolous litigation”) (internal
citations omitted).
165. Id. at 12 (pointing to “the small number of cases which result in a significant monetary
payment to shareholders or an injunction enjoining the deal from completion”).
166. In re Zale Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 9388–VCP, 2015 WL 5853693, at *10
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2015); see also id. (“Until the Supreme Court signals otherwise, I interpret [prior
precedent] as holding that an enhanced standard of review cannot be pared down to the business
judgment rule as a result of a statutorily required stockholder vote, even one rendered by a fully
informed, disinterested majority of stockholders.”). After Corwin, Vice Chancellor Parsons granted
re-argument on the issue and dismissed all claims. See In re Zale Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 9388–VCP,
2015 WL 6551418 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2015).
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bolt from the blue it is sometimes portrayed as, the fact that a Vice Chancellor
directly contradicted its holding mere months earlier suggests it was hardly an
uncontroversial application of uniform precedent.
The Corwin opinion at least partially masks this uncertainty in two ways. First,
it repeatedly cites as authority cases on stockholder approval of director actions that
have little or nothing to do with mergers, assuming a fortiori that the same
considerations apply equally in the merger context. As noted above, footnote 19 of
the Corwin opinion cites sixteen cases as “additional precedent under Delaware law
the proposition that the approval of the disinterested stockholders in a fully
informed, uncoerced vote that was required to consummate a transaction has the
effect of invoking the business judgment rule.” Of these sixteen, ten do not involve
mergers at all, but are instead cases involving approval of spin-offs of subsidiaries,
asset sales, charter amendments, or incentive compensation plans.167 In most of
these ten cases, enhanced scrutiny under Revlon or Unocal is never even a possibility
that is discussed, and in none of them is Revlon or Unocal held to apply.
Two of the remaining six cases are from the 1920s and 1930s and involved
challenges by preferred stockholders, with respect to whom fiduciary duties apply
somewhat differently.168 One involved a challenge to an asset sale where it is far
from clear Revlon would apply under modern law.169 The other, MacFarlane,
challenged a stock-for-stock consolidation—where, again, Revlon would likely not
apply—and involved a dispute over the division of the merger proceeds between
the common and preferred stockholders, rather than the overall adequacy of the
consideration.170 In MacFarlane, the issue of ratification was rather theoretical, given
that fewer than half the preferred shares had been voted in favor of the
consolidation in any case, and most of these were voted by stockholders who also
had substantial crossholdings of common stock.171 None of these twelve cases

167. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992) (involving charter amendments that the court
found not to implicate Unocal); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987) (involving Sec. 144
ratification of self-interested loans); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979) (involving
stockholder approval of a stock option plan); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57 (Del. 1952)
(involving approval of a stock option plan); Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 2007) (involving
a charter amendment and incentive compensation plan); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098
(Del. Ch. 1999) (involving the spinoff and recapitalization of a subsidiary of General Motors); In re
General Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611 (Del. Ch. 1999) (same); Apple Comput.,
Inc. v. Exponential Tech., Inc., No. 16315, 1999 WL 39547 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21 1999) (involving a
challenge to an asset sale conducted without a statutorily required stockholder vote which was found
to have been remedied by subsequent submission to the stockholders for ratification); Weiss
v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., No. 8811, 1989 WL 80345 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1989) (involving a charter
amendment); Schiff v. RKO Pictures Corp., 104 A.2d 267 (Del. Ch. 1954) (involving a sale of assets to
the CEO).
168. See generally Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78
BROOK. L. REV. 1163 (2013).
169. Cole v. Nat’l Cash Credit Ass’n, 156 A. 183 (Del. Ch. 1931).
170. MacFarlane v. N. Am. Cement Corp., 157 A. 396 (Del. Ch. 1928).
171. See id. at 399 (noting that the vote in favor of merger was “of little evidentiary value”).
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speaks clearly to the effect a stockholder vote should have in the special
circumstances of a change of control transaction.
Three of the remaining four cases cited were opinions written by Strine while
on the Court of Chancery. In all three, any analogy to the facts of Corwin would
have been dicta. For two of the three, any analogy would also be strained, as they
involved squeeze-outs, where Strine found that entire fairness applied, rather than
enhanced scrutiny.172 One of these two involved a challenge to the acquirer’s board
for paying too much, rather than the target’s for accepting too little.173 The third
case, Morton’s, is unquestionably analogous, involving a stockholder vote approving
an arm’s-length merger to which Revlon applied.174 On the question at issue in
Corwin, however, any statement in Morton’s is emphatically dicta, given that the
defendants never raised the argument that the stockholder vote altered the standard
of review.175 The fact that counsel for defendants—experienced litigators from top
firms like Young Conaway; Potter Anderson; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius; Connolly
Gallagher and Jones Day176—did not even make this apparently case-winning
argument in a 2013 case perhaps undermines Morton’s as support for the notion
that Corwin is nothing new.
Only one of the sixteen cases—In re Lukens177—involved a stockholder vote
in a merger where enhanced scrutiny under Revlon would apply, and was not dicta.
As such, it does support the holding of Corwin.178 The Lukens opinion was notably
cautious, however, admitting that “the matter is hardly free from doubt.”179
Furthermore, Vice Chancellor Lamb limited his holding in Lukens to cases “where
there was an active bidding process, no measures precluded any participant from
bidding, and the merger agreement presented to stockholders represented the
highest offer made by anyone.”180 On its face, and as applied, Corwin blocks judicial
scrutiny under a far broader set of circumstances.
Elsewhere in the opinion, two additional cases are cited in support of the
central holding.181 The first is another opinion from then-Vice Chancellor Strine
172. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 763 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(“This is the post-trial decision in an entire fairness case.”); In re PNB Holding Co., No. Civ. A 28-N,
2006 WL 2403999 at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (finding “that the Merger is presumptively subject to
entire fairness review”).
173. In re S. Peru Copper, 52 A.3d 761.
174. In re Morton’s Rest. Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656 (Del. Ch. 2013).
175. Id. at 663 n.34 (suggesting that stockholder approval would invoke the business judgment
rule, but acknowledging that “[t]he defendants here, however, have not made this particular argument”).
176. Id. at 657.
177. In re Lukens, 757 A.2d 720 (Del. Ch. 1999).
178. While Lukens was a Chancery Court opinion, it was affirmed without opinion “on the
basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Court of Chancery in its well-reasoned opinion.” Walker
v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d at 1278 (Del. 2000).
179. In re Lukens, 757 A.2d at 736.
180. Id. at 737.
181. The same two cases—along with several of the sixteen just discussed—are cited for
support in the Court of Chancery’s MFW opinion. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 527
(Del. Ch. 2013).
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dealing with the very different question of approval of a merger by the acquiring
firm’s stockholders.182 As such, it is of limited support for the holding in Corwin.
The second, however, is the celebrated Wheelabrator case, which famously outlines
the different effects stockholder approval can have under Delaware law.183
Wheelabrator involves a situation roughly analogous to that at issue in Corwin, and is
undoubtedly the best-known case prior to Corwin to address the issue. Together,
Wheelabrator and Lukens are the clearest precedents for the holding in Corwin.
The Corwin court did address, directly and convincingly, the recent,
superficially conflicting precedent of Gantler v. Stephens.184 In Gantler, Justice Jacobs
attempted to clean up decades of loose usage of the term “ratification,” which could
be traced back to language from the Van Gorkom opinion. As he had in his
Wheelabrator opinion, Justice Jacobs sought to distinguish between 1) “‘classic’ or
paradigmatic” ratification, which “describes the situation where shareholders
approve board action that, legally speaking, could be accomplished without any
shareholder approval,” and 2) “the effect of an informed shareholder vote that was
statutorily required for the transaction to have legal existence.”185 Justice Jacobs
clarified that only the first situation actually constituted ratification.186 This, of
course, would exclude a stockholder vote approving a merger, which is statutorily
required in order for the transaction to have legal existence.
The plaintiffs in Corwin argued that Gantler’s holding meant that a stockholder
vote on a merger can have no ratifying effect. The court sensibly rejected this
argument, concluding that Gantler was focused on clarifying the “precise term
‘ratification’” and was not intended to imply that a statutorily required stockholder
vote could have no effect on the appropriate standard of review.187 This is the most
plausible reading of Gantler, given that the plaintiffs’ reading would mean the court
had, without expressing any such intention, overruled the substantive holding of
Wheelabrator—an opinion also written by Jacobs and quoted approvingly
throughout the Gantler opinion.188 Any such holding would also have been dicta,
given that the court found that the stockholder vote at issue was not fully informed
because the relevant disclosures were defective.189

182. Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999).
183. See In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995).
184. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
185. Id. at 713 (quoting In re Wheelabrator, 663 A.2d 1194, 1202 n.4).
186. Id. (“To restore coherence and clarity to this area of our law, we hold that the scope of the
shareholder ratification doctrine must be limited to its so-called ‘classic’ form; that is, to circumstances
where a fully informed shareholder vote approves director action that does not legally require
shareholder approval in order to become legally effective.”).
187. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 311 (Del. 2015).
188. Id. at 310.
189. Id. (endorsing the trial court’s holding that “any statement about the effect a statutorily
required vote had on the appropriate standard of review would have been dictum because in Gantler
the Court held that the disclosures regarding the vote in question . . . were materially misleading”). For
a more thorough argument in favor of the Corwin court’s reading of Gantler, see Laster, supra note 22,
at 1477–83.
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Unlike Gantler, however, a number of conflicting precedents exist that are
either glossed over or ignored entirely by the Corwin court. The most prominent of
these is the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in Santa Fe, which arguably
should have controlled.190 The case involved a battle to acquire Santa Fe Industries,
where Santa Fe’s board allegedly took a number of defensive actions to protect a
deal with a friendly acquirer and ward off a competing hostile bidder.191 While the
hostile bidder initially sought a preliminary injunction, after several unfavorable
rulings it withdrew its bid, leaving the stockholders as the remaining plaintiffs, and
they persisted in their claims post-closing, after a stockholder vote approving the
merger with the favored bidder.192
The defendants argued that the informed stockholder vote extinguished any
claims under Revlon and Unocal.193 Though the court agreed that the vote had been
an informed one, the court rejected the ratification argument, holding that
“[p]ermitting the vote of a majority of stockholders on a merger to remove from
judicial scrutiny unilateral Board action in a contest for corporate control would
frustrate the purposes underlying Revlon and Unocal.”194 The court explained its
reasoning as follows:
In voting to approve the [merger], the Santa Fe stockholders were not
asked to ratify the Board’s unilateral decision to erect defensive measures
against the [competing] offer. The stockholders were merely offered a
choice between the [Board’s favored] Merger and doing nothing. The Santa
Fe stockholders did not vote in favor of the precise measures under
challenge in the complaint . . . . Since the stockholders of Santa Fe merely
voted in favor of the merger and not the defensive measures, we decline
to find ratification in this instance.195
The court went on to find that enhanced scrutiny was the proper standard for
reviewing the Santa Fe board’s actions, requiring the defendants “to justify their
decisionmaking within a range of reasonableness.”196
The holding of Santa Fe was on similar facts as Corwin—an arm’s-length
merger approved by an informed vote of the stockholders. It answered the same
question—the effect of the stockholder vote on the standard of review. It was
decided by the Delaware Supreme Court rather than a trial court. Furthermore, the
holding was not dicta. This combination of attributes makes it unique among the
cases mentioned in Corwin. The court did not, however, analyze Santa Fe. Instead,
it noted that “the parties have engaged in an interesting debate” about it, but
declared that it was “unnecessary to engage in that debate, when the overwhelming

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. S’holders Litig., 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
Id. at 63–65.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id. at 72.
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weight of our state’s case law supports the Chancellor’s decision below.”197 The
court also noted that “a learned article [by Vice Chancellor Laster] has a thoughtful
consideration of [Santa Fe].”198 In light of this statement, it is worth quoting that
article’s conclusion that “the case [Santa Fe] stands as an apparent impediment to
the view that a fully informed stockholder vote on a merger otherwise subject to
enhanced scrutiny causes the transaction to be reviewed under the business
judgment rule.”199
In addition, the Corwin court did not cite any of a number of Chancery Court
opinions applying enhanced scrutiny to post-closing damages claims, even in the
presence of a stockholder vote that was conceded or found to be informed.200 Nor
did the court take notice of the large settlements reached in recent cases like El Paso
or Del Monte, involving post-closing merger class actions following informed
stockholder votes.201 Following Corwin, it appears unlikely these cases could survive
a motion to dismiss, let alone result in settlements far beyond the costs of litigation.
Perhaps most revealing, however, was the Delaware Supreme Court’s
approach in the well-known Lyondell case.202 In the opinion being appealed, Vice
Chancellor Noble had applied enhanced scrutiny under Revlon in denying a motion
to dismiss claims that the defendants had not taken appropriate steps to secure the
best price reasonably available.203 Enhanced scrutiny was applied—and found to
preclude dismissal—despite the overwhelming stockholder vote in favor of the
merger, and despite the defendant’s argument that the vote constituted a
ratification.204
In his opinion, Noble found that the ratification defense had been raised too
late in the proceedings for the plaintiffs to respond adequately, but nonetheless
engaged in a lengthy digression on the issue.205 After acknowledging fellow Vice
Chancellor Strine’s dicta in Solomon that “an informed and uncoerced shareholder
vote on the [merger] provides an independent reason to maintain business judgment
197. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, n.20 (Del. 2015).
198. Id.
199. Laster, supra note 22, at 1477.
200. See, e.g., In re Zale Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 9388–VCP, 2015 WL 5853693, at *10
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2015) (“Until the Supreme Court signals otherwise, I interpret Gantler as holding that
an enhanced standard of review cannot be pared down to the business judgment rule as a result of a
statutorily required stockholder vote, even one rendered by a fully informed, disinterested majority of
stockholders.”); In re Novell, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6032–VCN, 2014 WL 6686785
(Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014) (applying enhanced scrutiny to arm’s-length merger despite overwhelming,
informed stockholder approval); Rand v. W. Air Lines, Inc., No. 8632, 1994 WL 89006
(Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1994) (“Such a claim requires the Court to apply enhanced scrutiny.”).
201. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012) ($110 million
settlement); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., No. 6027–VCL (Del. Ch. June 7, 2011) ($89.4
million settlement).
202. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
203. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., No. 3176–VCN, 2008 WL 2923437, at *12 (Del. Ch. July
29, 2008).
204. Id.
205. Id. at n.129.
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protection for the board’s acts,”206 Noble concluded that the reasoning of Santa Fe
was more persuasive. Just as the Supreme Court had found that Santa Fe’s
stockholders “could not have approved the board’s unilateral decision to erect
defensive barriers” by voting for the merger, Lyondell’s stockholders “could not
have been asked to ratify the Board’s alleged unilateral decision to abdicate its
fundamental fiduciary obligations in that regard simply by voting in favor of
the Merger.”207
Vice Chancellor Noble’s opinion was reversed on appeal. Interestingly,
however, the Delaware Supreme Court did not address the standard of review issue
at all, which would have furnished easy grounds for reversal. Instead, the court
conducted a delicate analysis of when exactly Revlon duties attach and what they
require from a target board. It may be that the Delaware Supreme Court agreed that
the defendants had waived the argument, but the court’s failure even to mention
the issue—and resolve an evident confusion—suggests that the issue was not
entirely cut and dried.
Given the foregoing, it is difficult to conclude that Corwin was simply an
application of a deep strain of uncontroversial precedent. The picture of precedent
presented in the opinion is only partial. At best, Corwin presents a case of selective
and dubious citation. At worst, it represents the bootstrapping of prior Chancery
Court dicta into binding precedent. Of course, it is tempting to say that it does not
matter whether Corwin is really “new” or not. Whether it is good or bad depends
little on its novelty.208 Nonetheless, the burden of persuasion often rests, and
sensibly so, on the party seeking a change in the status quo.
B. Pre-Closing Claims Are Insufficient to Police Merger-Related Misconduct
The argument that Revlon and Unocal were never intended to provide enhanced
scrutiny to post-closing money damages actions involves several claims. The first is
historical, and was evaluated in the last sub-Section, with inconclusive results. The
second is that pre-closing preliminary injunction suits are sufficient for policing the
“omnipresent specter” of conflicts of interest in merger transactions. And arguably
third, that injunctive suits by competing bidders are likely to be effective in policing
misconduct.209 Regardless of what enhanced scrutiny under Revlon and Unocal was
“designed” to do, if having it at the preliminary injunction stage is sufficient, there
would be little need for it post-closing. Conversely, if pre-closing enhanced scrutiny

206. Id. (quoting Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1117 (Del. Ch. 1999)).
207. Id.
208. As then-Chancellor Strine noted in his MFW opinion, “tradition should admittedly not
persist if it lacks current value.” In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 527 (Del. Ch. 2013) (citing
Keeler v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co., 672 A.2d 1012, 1017 n.6 (Del. 1996)) (a rule should not be followed
if its best defense is that it was “laid down in the time of Henry IV”) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
209. As noted above, many, if not most, of the landmark merger cases have involved a rival
bidder as plaintiff. See cases cited, supra note 126.
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is unlikely to be effective in policing serious conflicts, it may be appropriate to retain
it in post-closing damages actions.
In addressing these contentions, it is helpful to recall the kinds of conflicts
that can plague merger-related decisions. As then-Chancellor Strine noted in his
opinion in El Paso:
[A]s Revlon itself made clear, the potential sale of a corporation has
enormous implications for corporate managers and advisors, and a range
of human motivations, including but by no means limited to greed, can
inspire fiduciaries and their advisors to be less than faithful to their
contextual duty to pursue the best value for the company’s stockholders.210
Put simply, merger decisions are different from other types of decisions—
even important decisions—boards make while running a firm as a going concern.
The potential conflicts fall under three broad headings in the context of an
arm’s-length merger.211
First is the concern that managers212 will seek to entrench themselves. The
conflict is fairly obvious. Managers want to keep their jobs and the accompanying
perquisites. In the event of a takeover, however, the new owners would boot them
out of office. As a result, they may be willing to spurn an offer that would be
beneficial to the stockholders. This was a dominant concern in the 1980s merger
cases, including Unocal and Revlon, at a time of heated debate over the rise of
leveraged buyouts, hostile takeovers, and the market for corporate control.213 The
conflict can result in defensive measures, such as poison pills, designed to ward off
a takeover altogether,214 or favoritism and deal protections intended to steer the
firm into the arms of a favored bidder who will not replace management.215 In the
former, the harm to stockholders comes from losing out on an attractive deal. In
210. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012).
211. Additional conflicts of a fairly obvious nature come into play in non-arm’s-length mergers
(i.e., management buyouts or controlling stockholder squeeze-outs). It is worth noting, however, that
even an ostensibly arm’s length merger can end up infected by the kinds of dynamics normally
associated with conflicted mergers. In El Paso, for example, El Paso’s lead financial adviser, Goldman
Sachs, owned a 19% stake in the acquirer, Kinder Morgan, giving it a large incentive to get the lowest
price possible. In re El Paso, 41 A.3d at 434. Meanwhile, the bankers brought in to cleanse this conflict,
Morgan Stanley, only got paid in event the merger with Kinder Morgan was consummated, receiving
nothing if another option were pursued. Id. at 442.
212. Rather than repeatedly employing the cumbersome locution “officers and directors,” I will
refer to both together as “managers” in this section. While it is obviously the directors who are the
ultimate decision-makers in the merger context, as a practical matter the officers will also generally play
a large, perhaps dominant role.
213. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1180–81 (1981) (describing the
market for corporate control and the risk of entrenchment and arguing that most defensive measures
should be proscribed).
214. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (involving
Unocal management’s efforts to ward off a hostile tender offer from Mesa Petroleum).
215. See, e.g., Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184
(Del. 1985) (involving Revlon management’s efforts to steer itself to a favored acquirer while warding
off a hostile bidder).
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the latter, the harm comes from management leaving stockholder money on the
table in exchange for job security.
Second is the broader concern that management will seek to divert value from
the stockholders to themselves.216 This siphoning off of value can be done in
innumerable ways, ranging from employment agreements,217 to change-in-control
payments,218 to sweetheart side-deals,219 to straight-out cash bribes.220 The concern
that management will try to steal from stockholders is, however, hardly unique to
the merger context. Management always has an incentive to siphon value away from
the firm and the stockholders and into their own pockets.
What changes in the merger context is not the motive—or not exclusively the
motive—but the opportunity. As many commentators have pointed out, while most
managerial decisions take place in the context of on ongoing series of repeat
transactions, the decision to approve a merger is, in game theoretic terms, a “final
period” transaction.221 The business may continue after a merger, but as far as the
relationship between managers and stockholders goes, a merger is the end of the
road. For most decisions, managerial discretion is heavily constrained by a large
number of legal and extra-legal constraints, including annual director elections,
regular reports under securities law, product markets, capital markets, and labor
markets, among others.222 Managers who behave foolishly or dishonestly in one
period face the possibility of being found out, punished, or shamed in the next.
Such constraints do not operate in the context of a final period transaction like a
merger. In this respect, mergers are unlike partial asset sales, incentive compensation

216. In a sense, entrenchment is simply a subset of this broader concern—management trading
off value for the stockholders for the value of their own jobs. The entrenchment concern is sufficiently
important, however, to merit emphasis in its own right.
217. See Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2000) (declining to
dismiss a duty of loyalty claim involving a CEO who negotiated a lucrative employment agreement in
connection with a merger transaction).
218. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 687 (Del. Ch. 2014) (declining to grant
summary judgment on a claim that officers of a target company favored a bidder who “was willing to
confirm that it would honor management’s change in control agreements and monetize all equity
awards”).
219. See In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434 (Del. Ch. 2012) (noting that the
target company’s CEO was simultaneously planning to personally buy back part of the company from
the acquirer, giving him an incentive to reach a lower price).
220. See, e.g., Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (manager “allegedly
demanded that any potential acquirer pay [him] for his approval of the merger”).
221. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon Land, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3277, 3291 (2013) (“[S]tructural decisions—such as corporate takeovers—present a final period
problem entailing an especially severe conflict of interest.”); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions
in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1945 (2003) (“Another corporate law last period
problem occurs when a company is sold . . . .”).
222. See Bainbridge, supra note 221, at 3292 (“[S]hareholder voting is just one of an array of
extrajudicial constraints that, in totality, incentivize directors to exercise reasonable care in decision
making. In particular, directors and managers are subject to important constraints imposed by the
product and job markets.”); Griffith, supra note 221, at 1937–41 (discussing various legal and extra-legal
constraints on managerial decision making).
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plans, purchase of another company, or even charter amendments—the subjects of
most of the cases cited by the Corwin case as supposedly analogous instances of
stockholder ratification.
Another aspect of the final period problem is that the division of value
becomes a zero-sum game. In the ordinary course, barring completely perverse
compensation schemes, management prospers in some rough correlation to the
extent stockholders prosper. Management thus has an incentive to increase the size
of the pie today, in order to increase their take tomorrow. In a merger however,
once the amount of the merger consideration is fixed, the size of the pie is fixed
and there is no tomorrow. All that matters is the amount managers can take for
themselves now.
In short, in a merger, because it is a final period decision, many of the former
constraints on managerial opportunism fall away. As Professor Griffith puts it:
Because it simultaneously releases managers and directors from their
ordinary mid-stream constraints and increases the temptation to enrich
oneself at the expense of a dying corporation and its anonymous
shareholders, the last period signals a structural dilemma in corporate law,
a point at which managers and directors have greater incentives to favor
selfish objectives rather than the best interests of their shareholders. In the
context of a negotiated acquisition, the target corporation’s board and
management may demand side payments from the acquirer, thus
effectively diverting a portion of the merger consideration from the
shareholders to the management team.223
The only constraints on value-hoarding that remain are 1) the short-term need
to get stockholder approval; 2) the prospect of judicial sanction; and 3) reputational
interests.224 Even reputational concerns may be attenuated, however, if the
managers are near retirement or receiving a large enough cash-out to become
indifferent to censure.225
The third type of conflict is that managers, with their concentrated
investments of human and financial capital in the firm, will be more sensitive to
firm-specific risk than will diversified public stockholders. As a result, managers
will be risk-averse, and will rationally apply a higher discount rate to the future cash
flows of the firm than would an equally informed public stockholder. As a result,
they may be willing to sell their shares for less than a public stockholder would.226

223. Griffith, supra note 221, at 1947.
224. To be charitable, perhaps we could add to this list the managers’ internal moral compasses.
225. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms,
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1662 (2001) (noting that “if one can get
seriously rich, one can move to Aspen and ski for the rest of one’s days”).
226. Modern finance theory divides the risks faced by a firm into two broad categories: market
risk and firm-specific risk. (An investor can effectively eliminate their exposure to firm-specific risk by
holding a diversified portfolio. An undiversified stockholder, however, will bear both kinds of risks.
Because the undiversified stockholder receives the same expected cash flows but bears greater risk,
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This conflict is less frequently recognized but increasingly pervasive. Since the tax
reform of the early 1990s, an increasing percentage of managerial compensation is
in the form of stock options and stock grants, and many managers (including
directors) have a substantial portion of their personal wealth invested in the firms
they manage. The resulting conflict is especially acute when managers face restraints
on their ability to sell, such as long vesting periods, which would be obviated in the
event of a merger that triggers immediate vesting. Faced with a choice between a
certain payout of a life-changing amount of money now on the one hand, or an
uncertain payout in the future on the other, managers may opt for the former even
where the latter has a higher expected value.
Delaware case law has previously acknowledged precisely this sort of problem.
For example, then-Vice Chancellor Strine held in In re Lear that a CEO’s exposure
to non-diversifiable risk at a time when he was worried about retirement generated
a potential conflict. The then-Vice Chancellor observed that it was “silly” to ignore
the possibility that CEO stock ownership in a risky firm could “create incentives
that actually give managers reasons to pursue ends not shared by the corporation’s
public stockholders.”227 Likewise, the CEO “had powerful interests to agree to a
price and terms suboptimal for public investors so long as the resulting deal”
secured the CEO’s personal financial objectives of cashing out his equity stake.228
With these conflicts in view, we can now ask whether any or all of them are
amenable to policing by pre-closing actions seeking preliminary injunctions. For the
first type of conflict—entrenchment—the answer is likely a qualified “yes.” The
entrenchment motive only comes into play where there is a realistic prospect of a
hostile bidder, and that potential bidder ought to be relatively well-situated to
challenge improper defensive actions by the target board. Moreover, a court may be
more willing to grant a preliminary injunction when the likely result is an improved
offer or rival bid than when an injunction seems likely to kill the deal altogether. In
a sense, this conclusion is unsurprising, given that the Revlon and Unocal doctrines
were formulated in cases where entrenchment was the primary issue. Nonetheless,
the “yes” is qualified because current doctrine gives boards so much leeway to use
defensive measures that only an extremely motivated hostile bidder—or one facing
a particularly egregious set of facts—would undertake the expense of litigation
rather than simply moving on to other potential deals.229

their stock is less valuable to them. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 170 (10th ed. 2011).
227. In re Lear Corp. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 117 (Del. Ch. 2007).
228. Id. Of course, the public stockholders could always vote the deal down. But, as is discussed
more fully infra Part IV.F., in practice the managers can use their considerable information advantages
and control over projected results to persuade the stockholders to accept a deal they would not accept
if they were fully informed.
229. As Barry Diller famously concluded following his unsuccessful battle to take over
Paramount Communications: “They won. We lost. Next.” James Bates, Paramount Deal: As Show
Closes, a Look at the Script, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 1994).
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For the second type of conflict however—diversion of value to
management—it is unlikely that pre-closing preliminary injunction actions could be
effective. Certainly, potential acquirers are unlikely to make effective police, as
bidders will typically be concerned only with the aggregate cost of the merger, and
not with how that cost is divided between management and the stockholders.
Stockholders could challenge the action, but unless another obvious buyer waits in
the wings, they may be reluctant to do so if the available remedy is a preliminary
injunction that might kill the deal altogether. Indeed, even when substantial
evidence exists of managerial misconduct, a court may be hesitant to grant a
potentially deal-killing preliminary injunction, rather than let stockholders decide
whether “no deal” is less appetizing that a deal where management skims some off
the top.230
An injunction is simply not a remedy well-suited to the harm caused by
management siphoning value from a merger. More appropriate would be to allow
the stockholders to seek post-closing damages for the value diverted by
management, under an enhanced standard of review appropriate to the fraught
circumstances. Even this may not provide full compensation for what was lost, as
it is probable that management would be willing to trade off more than one dollar
of loss for the stockholders for every dollar of gain to themselves. But the possibility
of money damages would have the great virtue of deterring such conduct in the first
place. Corwin, however, forecloses this possibility. Under Corwin, as long as the
relevant conflicts and side-deals are disclosed, a stockholder vote approving the
merger would effectively extinguish all claims.
It is worth noting at this point that although Corwin holds out the prospect of
stockholders being able to show disclosure defects that rendered the stockholder
approval uninformed, this is likely to be rare in practice. Most disclosure or
securities fraud claims arise when faulty disclosures are revealed to have been faulty
by subsequent events or disclosures, or by information uncovered in enforcement
actions or related litigation discovery. In the case of a merger where the target
company is going private, disappearing, or being subsumed within a larger entity, it

230. Again, El Paso is an excellent illustration of this dynamic. Despite finding “that the
plaintiffs have a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that the Merger was tainted by disloyalty,”
then-Chancellor Strine concluded that “[b]ecause, however, there is no other bid on the table and the
stockholders of El Paso, as the seller, have a choice whether to turn down the Merger themselves, the
balance of harms counsels against a preliminary injunction.” In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d
432, 434 (Del. Ch. 2012); see also id. at 452 (“I reluctantly deny the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction, concluding that the El Paso stockholders should not be deprived of the chance to decide
for themselves about the Merger, despite the disturbing nature of some of the behavior leading to its
terms.”); Brian Broughman, CEO Side Payments in Mergers and Acquisitions, 2017 BYU L. REV. 67,
105 (2017) (“Judges do not have a line-item veto, and are therefore reluctant to strike down a
multi-billion-dollar transaction because of side payments. Judges are reluctant to use their injunctive
power for the same reason that shareholders and directors have trouble blocking such deals—a deal
with an unsavory side payment is better than no deal at all.”).
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is unlikely there will be any subsequent events or disclosures to reveal the falsity of
the original disclosures, and Corwin itself will serve to block litigation discovery after
the preliminary injunction stage. Thus, while Corwin allows management to disclose
their misdeeds candidly and receive absolution via an informed stockholder vote,
more furtive managers will likely be able to hide their indiscretions with little fear
of subsequent revelation. The resulting dynamic is likely to be: if it comes out in
discovery in a preliminary injunction action, disclose it and it will be sterilized by
the stockholder vote; if it doesn’t come out pre-close, it never will.
The third conflict—risk-aversion on the part of management—is also unlikely
to be amenable to regulation by pre-closing preliminary injunction. Certainly,
would-be acquirers will rarely have an incentive to argue that managers are
undervaluing the target company. And it is a bold judge who will grant an injunction
on this basis.231 Again, the prospect of post-closing damages—which Corwin makes
vanishingly slim—is better calculated to provide compensation and, more
importantly, deterrence.
In sum, the argument that enhanced scrutiny under Revlon and Unocal is (and
ought to be) designed only for pre-closing preliminary injunction actions is partly
correct, but incomplete. Pre-closing scrutiny is likely to be appropriate and
reasonably effective in dealing with managerial self-interest arising out of the
entrenchment motive, but inappropriate and ineffective in policing other
predictable and acute conflicts of interest in the merger context.
C. Deference to the Stockholder Vote is not Supported by the Underlying Reasons for the
Business Judgment Rule
The argument that deference to a stockholder vote approving a merger is in
keeping with the business judgment rule is, when one looks beneath the surface, an
odd one. The key issue in both MFW and Corwin is what deference to accord to a
stockholder vote. Both cases deal with a situation where management has already
made a decision, and that decision is subject to a heightened standard of review
(entire fairness in MFW and enhanced scrutiny in Corwin). The question, then, is
whether to provide additional deference to a stockholder vote on the same decision.
The business judgment rule is generally concerned with deference to the business
decisions of managers, not stockholders, who are not typically vested with the
power to make business decisions in the first place.232 As such, the rationales of the
business judgment rule do not easily map on to the question of deference to a
stockholder vote.

231. See In re Lear Corp. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 123 (Del. Ch. 2007) (granting a
preliminary injunction until supplemental disclosure was provided on the CEO’s financial motivations
to sell).
232. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003).
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A classic statement of the reasoning behind the business judgment rule was
given by Judge Winter in Joy v. North.233 Judge Winter identified three primary
rationales. First, by investing in a firm, stockholders take on the risk of bad
managerial decision-making voluntarily.234 Stockholders can refrain from investing
in the first place, sell their shares, or elect different managers. This point is
subsidiary to the more general point made in the last subsection, that most
managerial decisions take place in a setting of repeat transactions, and are thus
constrained by a host of factors. As Professor Bainbridge has elaborated in defense
of the business judgment rule, operational decisions are subject to “an array of
extrajudicial constraints that, in totality, give directors [an incentive] to exercise
reasonable care in decision making.”235
Second, judges are not well-situated to evaluate complex business decisions.236
As the Michigan Supreme Court pithily noted in the foundational case Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., “The judges are not business experts.”237 As such, judicial modesty
counsels a certain degree of deference to management, who are likely to be both
better informed and more expert than the judges.
Third, every business decision involves a degree of risk. Because risk and
return generally go hand-in-hand, stockholders want directors to take risks.238
Moreover, stockholders can reduce their exposure to these risks by holding a
diversified portfolio.239 If stockholders get most of the gain when risks turn out
well, but managers face a threat of personal liability when those risks turn out badly,
management’s incentives will be to make decisions that minimize the chance of
liability rather than maximize expected stockholder wealth.240
The Corwin court emphasized the second of Judge Winter’s rationales for the
business judgment rule, suggesting that its decision was “tied to the core rationale
of the business judgment rule, which is that judges are poorly positioned to evaluate
the wisdom of business decisions.”241 As an initial matter, this “core rationale” is
233. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
234. Id. at 885 (“Since shareholders can and do select among investments partly on the basis of
management, the business judgment rule merely recognizes a certain voluntariness in undertaking the
risk of bad business decisions.”).
235. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 130 (2004).
236. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 (“[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect
device to evaluate corporate decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not
easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call for quick decisions,
inevitably based on less than perfect information.”).
237. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 508 (1919).
238. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 (“[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it
is very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cautious
corporate decisions.”).
239. Id. (“Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their holdings.”) (internal
footnote omitted).
240. Id. (“A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives thus may not be in
the interest of shareholders generally.”).
241. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313 (Del. 2015).
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not one that many academic commentators have found convincing, given that the
same rationale would seem to apply with far greater force in any number of other
contexts where courts are tasked with evaluating the actions of experts.242 But
whatever its weaknesses as a rationale for deferring the managers—who can at least
safely be presumed to have expert knowledge of the firm—it is significantly weaker
as a rationale for deferring to stockholders.
The Corwin court attempts to finesse this by providing a very different
justification—that the stockholders can be deferred to because of their “actual
economic stake in the outcome.”243 This is a very different argument, however, than
the “core rationale” for the business judgment rule to which the court originally
alluded. It suggests that even if stockholders are not better situated to evaluate the
merger than the court, in terms of information and expertise, they are better
motivated. The specialist judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery, however,
themselves face powerful reputational incentives to make careful decisions.244
The first and third Joy v. North rationales apply even less clearly in the context
of a stockholder vote approving a merger. The first has no obvious application at
all. And it is difficult to fit a stockholder vote into the third, as stockholders face
no risk of personal liability from which they require shielding to encourage optimal
risk-taking. As a practical matter, though, MFW and Corwin implicate deference to
managers as much or more than deference to stockholders. As such, it is worth
considering the application of these two justifications for business judgment rule
deference to managers in the context of a merger.
For the first, as noted above, a merger is a final period decision, rather than
being part of a series of repeat transactions. For this reason, Professor Bainbridge,
among others, has drawn a sharp “distinction between operational issues, such as
whether to install lighting in a baseball park, and structural choices, especially those
creating a final period situation, such as takeovers.”245 Bainbridge—certainly no fan
of stockholder litigation—concludes that “[t]he former appropriately receives much
less probing review than does the latter.”246
The third rationale—not deterring risk-taking—may apply in the merger
context, though it applies somewhat differently. A decision to agree to a merger is
242. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 117 (calling this “an incomplete explanation for the
business judgment rule at best”); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 573, 581 (2000) (noting that “judges should find it far easier to overcome the barrier of
expertise and stand in the shoes of outside directors than in those of almost any of the other
professionals whose actions courts are routinely called upon to review”); Kent Greenfield & John
E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s Education: Using Dickens and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business
Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 799, 825–26 (“This rationale . . . seems more than a little
disingenuous.”).
243. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 314.
244. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 121 (discussing the powerful reputational incentives
faced by Delaware’s chancellors).
245. Id. at 129; see also E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in
America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 394 (1997) (making a similar distinction).
246. Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 129.
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not a decision to take a risk with stockholders’ money with the hope of achieving a
return for them in the future. It is a decision to stop taking risks, in exchange for a
more certain payout in the here and now. It may not be the case that managers need
judicial protection to induce them to take what is a fundamentally risk-averse
decision. That said, if, all else being equal, agreeing to a merger were to place a
director at greater risk of personal liability than not agreeing to a merger, directors
may have an incentive to avoid even beneficial mergers. Thus, it is important that
agreeing to a merger that is beneficial to stockholders does not place a director at a
greater risk of personal liability than refusing to agree to the same merger.
In sum, the core rationales of the business judgment rule provide little, if any,
reason for deference to a stockholder vote. These rationales are also attenuated even
for deference to managerial decisions in the context of a merger.
D. Independent Directors and Institutional Stockholders
Independent directors and institutional stockholders are not necessarily the
reliable gatekeepers they may appear to be at first blush. Independent directors do
not necessarily make effective monitors of managerial opportunism, and even
sophisticated stockholders operate at a severe informational disadvantage vis-à-vis
management.
The Delaware courts’ trust in the cleansing power of independent directors is
belied by a substantial empirical literature on their effectiveness, or lack thereof.247
While the available evidence shows that majority-independent boards tend to
perform better than the insider-dominated boards of yesteryear,248 the evidence
changes direction when it comes to supermajority-independent boards where the
CEO is the only inside director.249 Of particular concern in this context, the
evidence casts doubt on the ability of supermajority boards—which are present at

247. See, e.g., Velikonja, supra note 130, at 863 (“Surprisingly, a growing body of economic
research has failed to find any statistical correlation between supermajority independent boards and
corporate profitability or the likelihood of misconduct, leading academics and policy makers to question
their value.”).
248. See, e.g., id. at 867 (“Academic commentators generally agree that majority independent
boards are a good thing, certainly better than their insider-dominated peers.”); Ira M. Millstein & Paul
W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1292–94 (1998).
249. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 950 (1999); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for
the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 178 (2010); Jill Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO
L. REV. 265, 279–80 (1997); Donald Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms,
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 798 (2001); Larry
E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 26–27 (2002); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1530 (2005); Velikonja, supra note 130, at 868 (“In
contrast, virtually all academic commentators view supermajority independent boards as too much of a
good thing.”).
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a large majority of S&P 500 firms—to be effective at policing self-interested
behavior by senior management.250
These findings should not be surprising. Independent directors may be more
willing to discipline executives, but lacking the detailed knowledge of the firm that
comes from day-to-day involvement in management, they often lack the necessary
information.251 The spirit is willing but the knowledge is weak. To a very large
extent, independent directors are forced to rely upon the information provided to
them by the very managers they are meant to discipline.252 In evaluating the
desirability of a merger, independent directors will often be forced to rely on
management projections, the accuracy of which they may have difficulty evaluating.
In some cases, they may be little more informed than the stockholders and equally
dependent on information provided to them by management.
And despite the rise in institutional investors, there remains a serious
informational asymmetry between corporate managers and stockholders. Even a
sophisticated activist investor will find it difficult or impossible to acquire the
information—including properly non-public information—that corporate
managers acquire in the process of their day-to-day work.253 Even sophisticated
institutional investors are forced to rely, in large part, on the information disclosed
to them by management. In many cases, it would be difficult for management to
fully convey to investors the information required to accurately value the firm, even
if they in good faith wanted to.254 The problem is that much more acute where, as
in a merger, management has powerful incentive to dissemble and little fear of
future repercussions.255

250. See, e.g., Bhagat & Black, supra note 249, at 931, 931 nn.35–38 (summarizing empirical
studies showing that supermajority independent boards were correlated with higher executive
compensation and lower performance); Broughman, supra note 230, at 92–93 (“[A]s long as the CEO
remains the primary deal negotiator, even an independent board cannot wholly prevent rent
extraction.”); R. Richard Geddes & Hrishikesh D. Vinod, CEO Age and Outside Directors: A Hazard
Analysis, 12 REV. INDUS. ORG. 767, 769 (1997) (finding that majority-independent boards were more
likely than majority-insider boards to fire a CEO, but supermajority-independent boards were less likely
to do so).
251. See, e.g., Bhagat & Black, supra note 249, at 950; Velikonja, supra note 130, at 868 (“[W]holly
independent boards might be marginally more willing than only majority independent boards to fire a
failing chief executive or stop fraud, [but] they are less able to do so because their independence renders
them unaware of the problem.”).
252. See, e.g., Bhagat & Black, supra note 249, at 953; Jeffrey Gordon, The Rise of Independent
Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices,
59 STAN. L. REV., 1465, 1541 (2007); Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process Over Structure: An Organizational
Behavior Approach to Improving Corporate Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 266 (2012) (stating that
independent directors “face multiple informational disadvantages that may make it difficult for them
to evaluate management’s decisions.”); Velikonja, supra note 130, at 868 (“Many believe the share of
independent directors on the board and the amount of relevant information that the board possesses
are inversely correlated.”).
253. If this were not the case, insider trading would rarely be profitable.
254. See generally Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and
the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012).
255. See discussion supra Section IV.B.
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Though the share of stock held by institutional investors continues to grow,
there is also reason to think that information asymmetries will worsen in the near
future. A large and growing share of institutional investment is in the form of
“passive” index funds. Such investors, who currently hold approximately 30% of
U.S. equities, seek to assemble a diversified portfolio tracking a broad index such
as the S&P 500.256 They seek to offer a market return and compete by offering the
lowest possible fees to individual investors. As a result, they expend little or no
effort seeking to value the firms they invest in. While these index funds are certainly
“sophisticated” investors in the sense that they understand the central lesson of
modern portfolio theory—that picking stocks is usually a fool’s errand—they are
not “sophisticated” in the sense of knowing anything about the firms they invest
in.257 The whole philosophy of index investing is that it is unnecessary to know
anything about the firms you invest in. This philosophy, however, makes index
investors—who are projected by Moody’s to make up more than half of the assets
in the investment management business within the next four to seven years258—
singularly unlikely to make effective judges of fair value in a merger. When added
to the approximately 20% share of U.S. equities owned by individuals, we may
already be at or near the point where a majority of the stockholder vote is effectively
totally uninformed.
E. Incentive Effects of MFW
Probably the best justification for the holding of MFW is that it provides
controlling stockholders with an incentive—previously lacking—to employ a deal
structure likely to result in fair treatment of the minority stockholders. It is primarily
for this reason that several respected scholars had urged the result in MFW,259 and
I acknowledge its force in the controlling stockholder context. It should be noted,
however, that this rationale has little or no force when applied to Corwin, as Corwin
does not require management to do anything they were not already required to do—
provide full disclosure and hold a stockholder vote.

256. Investopedia describes an index fund as “a type of mutual fund with a portfolio
constructed to match or track components of a market index, such as the Standard & Poor’s 500
Index (S&P 500).” Index Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/
indexfund.asp [ https://perma.cc/457C-RZUF ] ( last visited Apr. 9, 2019 ).
257. See id. (“Since the fund managers of an index fund are simply replicating the performance
of a benchmark index, they do not need the services of research analysts and others that assist in the
stock-selection process.”); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 864 (1991) (noting that the index investor “does
not research the particular characteristics of a company”).
258. See Trevor Hunnicutt, Index Funds to Surpass Active Fund Assets in U.S. by 2024: Moody’s,
REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2017) (quoting a Moody’s report estimating “that passive investments will overtake
active market share between 2021 and 2024”), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-passive/
index-funds-to-surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-s-by-2024-moodys-idUSKBN15H1PN [ https://
perma.cc/P5F7-VB9X ].
259. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 16, at 839–40; Subramanian, supra note 16, at 60–61.
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A few additional points are worth making. As the MFW opinion recognized,
the benefits of the improved deal structure must be balanced against the loss of
judicial scrutiny.260 The court concluded that the benefits of judicial scrutiny were
“slim at best, and there is a good case to made that it is negative overall.”261 Other
balances, however, were possible. Instead of dropping all the way from entire
fairness to business judgment rule deference in exchange for employing an
independent committee and majority-of-the-minority condition, the court could
have simply reduced the standard of review to enhanced scrutiny. In this way,
controllers would still have an incentive to adopt the desired precautions, but some
prospect of judicial scrutiny would be preserved.
Perhaps the best response to this argument is that enhanced scrutiny would
be both too much, and too little. On the one hand, it would make it difficult to get
claims dismissed before discovery, thus preserving the settlement value of even
nuisance suits. On the other, enhanced scrutiny would not provide much value to
stockholders that they could not achieve by seeking appraisal.262 As a result, the
holding of MFW, while setting the table for the unfortunate Corwin, is probably a
net positive as a policy matter.
F. Stockholder Approval of a Merger Does Not Resemble Traditional Ratification
The analogy of stockholder approval of a merger to ratification appears
throughout both the MFW and Corwin opinions. Indeed, as noted above, the
majority of the cases relied upon by the Corwin court—to demonstrate the deep
precedential roots of its holding—involved stockholder approval of something
other than a merger.263 Some of them, such as approval of options grants, involved
what Gantler termed “classic” ratification. Others were statutorily required votes,
such as approval of charter amendments, which were not technically “ratification”
but nonetheless had a ratifying effect. The analogy to a merger vote is, in many ways,
natural. If the majority of stockholders find the merger acceptable, why should they
now be permitted to turn around and complain?
This analogy, however, is fatally flawed. Classic ratification requires a separate
vote for each specific action being ratified.264 A stockholder vote on a merger is a
bundled Hobson’s choice—take it, warts and all, or leave it. In theory, a negative
stockholder vote could send the parties back to the negotiating table to hammer out
260. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 534 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The loss from invoking the
business judgment rule standard of review is whatever residual value it provides to minority investors
to have the potential for a judicial review of fairness . . . .”).
261. Id.
262. To the extent, however, that a price approved by an independent committee and a majority
of the minority stockholders is treated in an appraisal proceeding as strongly persuasive evidence of fair
value, the compensatory and deterrence value of an appraisal proceeding would be vitiated. See infra
Part IV.G.
263. See supra 167–89 and accompanying text.
264. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2019) (requiring that “the contract or transaction
is specifically approved”).

First to Printer_Korsmo (Do Not Delete)

2019]

DELAWARE’S RETREAT

10/29/2019 1:34 PM

101

a better deal, but often there is a real prospect that stockholder rejection will scuttle
the merger altogether. As a result, the practical question facing stockholders is often
not “Is this deal the best price reasonably available?” or even “Is this deal fair?” but
rather “Is this deal better than no deal?” Sometimes an unfair deal is better than no
deal at all.265 Yet Corwin collapses the innumerable decisions and actions attendant
to a merger into a single yes or no vote for purposes of ratification.266
A stylized example may be helpful in illustrating the resulting problem.
Ignoring for a moment that stockholders are typically operating with serious
informational disadvantages,267 assume stockholders have perfect information
about the value of the firm and about managerial actions. Assume further that they
know that the firm is worth $80 per share on a standalone basis. They also know
that, due to substantial synergies and cost savings, the firm would be worth $120
per share to a competitor in a merger. With competent bargaining by faithful
management, they could expect to split those gains with the buyers, achieving a
“fair” price of $100. But management is unfaithful, and skims $5 per share off the
top in the form of sweetheart side-deals, presenting the stockholders with a deal for
$90 per share—trading off $2 in stockholder value for every dollar they capture—
and no assurance that any deal will be reached if the stockholders reject the $90.
Even in the presence of full information, the stockholders are likely to approve the
deal. The reality is worse, of course, given that stockholders will not have full
information, and management will be doing their best to convince them that $90 is
really a fantastic deal, and the best they could possibly hope for.
This problem is at the heart of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Santa
Fe, which the Corwin court declined to confront. As the Santa Fe court emphasized,
a vote in favor of the merger was not a vote in favor of the defensive measures
being challenged.268 The stockholders were not, and could not, be offered that

265. As Vice Chancellor Laster put it in the context of a controlling stockholder squeeze-out,
“[e]ven accepting that the minority stockholders can reject a controller’s proposal, collective action
problems prevent diffuse minority stockholders from bargaining affirmatively for better terms.” Laster,
supra note 22, at 1462. Even outside the controller context, stockholders would face significant hurdles
in seeking to arrange an alternative deal, or in replacing a board with directors who will.
266. See Brian Broughman, CEO Side Payments in Mergers and Acquisitions, 2017
BYU L. REV. 67, 87 (2017) (“By bundling the side payment into a single yes-or-no merger vote,
management makes it impossible for target shareholders to oppose the side payment without also
voting against the merger. Provided the bundled deal is better than the status quo (i.e. no merger),
shareholders will rationally vote in favor of the entire transaction.”); id. at 67.
267. See Sharpe, supra note 252, at 266.
268. In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d 59, 68 (Del. 1995); see also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713
(Del. 2009) (citing approvingly to Santa Fe and noting that “the only director action or conduct that
can be ratified is that which the shareholders are specifically asked to approve”); Sample v. Morgan,
914 A.2d 647, 663–64 (Del. Ch. 2007). In Sample v. Morgan, then Vice-Chancellor Strine declined to
find that stockholder approval of a stock option plan ratified the actual issuances of options pursuant
to that plan. 914 A.2d at 633–64. Strine emphasized that “the Delaware doctrine of ratification does
not embrace a ‘blank check’ theory. When uncoerced, fully informed, and disinterested stockholders
approve a specific corporate action, the doctrine of ratification, in most situations, precludes claims for
breach of fiduciary duty attacking that action. But the mere approval by stockholders of a request by
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choice. They were “merely offered a choice between the [Board’s favored] Merger
and doing nothing.”269 Under Corwin, however, the stockholder vote provides
omnibus absolution, and any defensive measures and side-payments are ratified
along with everything else.
As a result, the incentives of management will be to present stockholders with
a deal that is just enough better than the alternatives to secure their approval, while
skimming as much as possible of the surplus value created by the merger for
themselves. In a sense, it will be true, as the Corwin court claims, that the
stockholders “have had the free and informed chance to decide on the economic
merits of a transaction for themselves.”270 But this is, at best, lukewarm comfort.
The stockholders’ evaluation of the economic merits is usually limited to finding
that the deal, warts and all, is better than nothing. The possibility remains of
significant deadweight losses to unfaithful management.
G. Appraisal is Not a Full Substitute
Elsewhere, together with Professor Myers, I have written extensively on
stockholder appraisal, cautiously praising it, and even proposing an alternative to
the class action mechanism patterned after some of the features of appraisal.271 My
heart beats a little faster to see the Delaware courts reference appraisal as a viable
alternative to a class action. In theory, appraisal, or something like appraisal, could
be a comprehensive alternative to merger class actions.272 But in the here and now,
appraisal is limited as a judicial backstop for at least three major reasons.
First, appraisal is not always available. In particular, appraisal is not available
in mergers where the consideration is publicly traded stock.273 This is so even when
the transaction constitutes a change of control that would trigger Revlon scrutiny.
Professor Myers and I have argued that conditioning the availability of appraisal on
the form of consideration is a mistake.274 But thus far the Delaware legislature has
not heeded our wisdom, and appraisal can play no role in a stock-for-stock merger.
Second, recent judicial trends in appraisal have mirrored developments in
merger class action law. In particular, in cases involving apparent arm’s-length
mergers, the Delaware courts have been increasingly likely to defer to the negotiated

directors for the authority to take action within broad parameters does not insulate all future action by
the directors within those parameters from attack.” Id.
269. In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 68.
270. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313 (Del. 2015); see also In re MFW
S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 534 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[A] majority-of-the-minority condition gives
minority investors a free and voluntary opportunity to decide what is fair for themselves.”).
271. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition: Replacing the Class
Action with a Market for Legal Claims, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1323 (2016).
272. See id. at 1370.
273. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (2019).
274. See Myers & Korsmo, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 279, 288
(2017).
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merger price as the best evidence of fair value.275 Most recently, in DFC Global276
and Dell,277 the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized the high hurdle for departing
from the negotiated price. In short, many of the same considerations that have
caused the court to grant business judgment rule deference in the class action
context have also caused it to grant deference to the negotiated price in the
appraisal context.278
Third, appraisal petitioners must forgo the merger consideration in order to
pursue appraisal.279 While recent amendments to Section 262 allow the acquirer to
pre-pay undisputed amounts in order to avoid the running of interest, this is a
unilateral option the acquirer need not exercise.280 Accordingly, petitioners face
substantial opportunity costs from having their capital tied up, potentially for years,
while bearing the costs and risks of litigation. As a result, appraisal is a relatively
blunt tool, which will only be worth using where the merger consideration is
substantially below fair value in percentage terms.
Assume, for example, managers skimmed $100 million off the top of a $10
billion merger, and stockholders holding 10% of the stock think they can prove it,
showing that fair value was really $10.1 billion. While $100 million is large in
absolute terms and would likely make a class action worthwhile, appraisal petitioners
are unlikely to tie up $1 billion and bear the costs and risks of litigation in pursuit
of $10 million (their share of the amount diverted). The structure of appraisal—in
particular the need to forgo the merger consideration—makes it ill-suited to control
deadweight losses that, while large in absolute terms, are small in percentage terms.
H. The Benefits of Merger Litigation
The evidence that merger litigation has not heretofore functioned well is
canvassed above and need not be repeated. A few caveats, however, are in order.
There is, at this point, a mountain of evidence that the merits have not historically
mattered in merger litigation.281 That the merits do not matter, however, should not
275. See, e.g., Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Services, Inc., C.A. No. 9320-VCL, 2016
WL 7324170, at *30–33 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc.,
C.A. No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 6164771 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015); Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc.,
C.A. No. 8509-VCN, 2015 WL 2069417, at *56 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015); In re Appraisal of
Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015); cf. Dunmire
v. Farmers & Merchants Bancorp of W. Pa., Inc., C.A. No. 10589-CB, 2016 WL 6651411
(Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016).
276. DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 366 (Del. 2017).
277. Dell, Inc., v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 23–31
(Del. 2017).
278. At least one member of the Court of Chancery has concluded that the logic of the recent
Supreme Court pronouncements on appraisal may—where significant synergies exist—compel the trial
court to award the unaffected, pre-announcement market price in an appraisal proceeding. See Verition
Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *66, *124–
28 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018).
279. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(2)(e).
280. Id. at § 262(2)(h).
281. See Wolinsky & Schireson, supra note 56.
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be taken to imply that there are no merits. The “merits don’t matter” problem is
two-sided. Meritless claims are brought and settled quickly. And meritorious claims
are brought and also settled (usually too quickly).
It is worth considering the likely scale of the problem. It is impossible to
quantify the costs of merger litigation with any precision, but we can make some
(extremely) crude estimates. Cain et al. find approximately one hundred mergers
being challenged each year since 2010, with some cases being dismissed, and a few
score—eighty-nine in the busiest year—settlements each year.282 While some claims
result in more meaningful settlements (and more meaningful legal fees), the bulk of
the settlements—and the most obviously troubling ones—are disclosure-only.283
For these settlements, the mean legal fees awarded hovers around $500,000.284 With
these figures in mind, if we assume a worst-case scenario of one hundred disclosureonly settlements a year, that would come to $50 million in plaintiff’s attorney fees.
Even if we multiply this figure by a factor of ten to account for other deadweight
costs of litigation, this comes to $500 million per year, spread across the multitrillion-dollar deal market. As taxes go, the “deal litigation tax” is far from the most
onerous.285
Of course, if deal litigation produces no benefits, any costs at all are a waste.
And cases providing real compensation for stockholders are few and far between.286
Nonetheless, compensation is only one value implicated in litigation, and likely not
the primary one in merger litigation, where the value of deterrence will tend to loom
larger. Even a small likelihood of personal monetary liability—or even just the
prospect that embarrassing facts will be revealed in discovery—can serve a powerful
deterrent function, providing far greater societal benefit than any after-the-fact
compensation for stockholders.
In this respect, a recent study provides intriguing findings that the average
value of change-in-control packages for senior executives in deals “substantial
enough to warrant an ISS recommendation” was 2.1% of deal value in the first half
of 2017, as compared to an average of 1.36% from 2012–2016.287 While the

282. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 26.
283. Id. at 24.
284. Jill Fisch, Sean Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement
in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 568 (2015).
285. To perform the classic comparison designed to make large dollar amounts seem small,
$500 million in merger litigation costs would represent less than 1% of the $66.75 billion Americans
spent on their pets in 2016. See Pet Industry Market Size & Ownership Statistics, AMERICAN PET
PRODUCTS, http://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp [ https://perma.cc/AH
5V-UVL7 ] ( last visited Apr. 12, 2019 ).
286. But see Joel E. Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points of Successful
Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform, BUS. LAW. (manuscript at 3–6) (forthcoming 2018)
(collecting cases involving substantial monetary recoveries for stockholders).
287. Matthew Schoenfeld, The High Cost of Fewer Appraisal Claims in 2017: Premia Down,
Agency Costs Up 4–5 (Aug. 29, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3028381
[ https://perma.cc/7GS5-VT9Q ].
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evidence is far too limited to ascribe this increase to any particular cause,288 it does
serve as a useful reminder that even small changes in management behavior can
create effects that dwarf the costs of merger litigation.
In any event, the evidence that merger litigation produces, on net, little benefit
all pre-dates Trulia. It is frustrating, from a social science standpoint, that Trulia and
Corwin came so close together in time, making it impossible to untangle their effects.
We will never know what effect Trulia—whose approach promised to limit meritless
litigation while encouraging meritorious litigation—would have had independent of
Corwin—which, as I argue above, made even meritorious claims difficult or
impossible to pursue.
V. CONCLUSION
The crisis in merger litigation demanded a judicial response. Unfortunately, it
got two. In Trulia, it got the response that was required, a new scrutiny of the lowvalue settlements and releases that provided the fuel for the spread of merger
litigation. Trulia promised to block low-value litigation, while enabling high-value
litigation to be litigated more effectively. In Corwin, however, the merger crisis
received a response that may do more harm than good. The doctrine espoused in
Corwin—whether it is new or not—will certainly reduce meritless merger litigation.
But it is also effectively forecloses the possibility of judicial scrutiny for predictable
forms of managerial opportunism that are unlikely to be adequately policed by
independent directors, stockholders, or competing bidders.
In closing, I will offer some tentative prescriptions. Ideally, the effects of
Trulia would have been allowed to play out without any other significant changes
to the substantive law. It is worth remembering that data from prior to the merger
litigation boom suggested that merger class actions were functioning relatively
well.289 Given the ability of plaintiff’s lawyers to bring merger suits in non-Delaware
jurisdictions,290 it would have taken some time for the post-Trulia picture to become
clear, with other jurisdictions adopting (or not adopting) the Trulia standard, and
firms employing (or not employing) forum-selection bylaws or other measures to
keep litigation in Delaware.291 At that point, additional measures, such as fee-

288. In particular, it could be an artifact of rising equity prices in 2017 increasing the value of
stock options that vest in the event of a change-of-control.
289. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 17, at 137–38.
290. See, e.g., Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 467
(2014).
291. See, e.g., William B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, The Trouble with Trulia: Reevaluating the Case for Fee-Shifting Bylaws as a Solution to Overlitigation of Corporate Claims 2 (Apr. 4,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2946477 [ https://perma.cc/K3N95CTD ]; Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can Fix the Deal Tax
and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t 1, 12 ( Jan. 5, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2855950 [ https://perma.cc/S5MQ-HCY2 ].
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shifting bylaws, could have been considered as necessary.292 Unfortunately, Corwin
cut short this process and muddied the empirical picture.
Steps are possible, however, short of reversing course on Corwin altogether,
which seems an unlikely prospect. One possibility would be to distinguish more
carefully than has thus far been done among the various types of conflicts that
can plague takeover situations. Three such conflicts were catalogued
above: 1) entrenchment; 2) diversion of merger value; and 3) risk-aversion due to
concentrated holdings. Of these, only entrenchment is likely to be adequately
policed by the pre-closing preliminary injunction actions Corwin holds out as the
only option. The other two are unlikely to be seriously constrained by independent
directors, a stockholder vote, or a preliminary injunction action. Both are far better
suited for scrutiny via a post-closing money damages action. Both also involve selfserving conduct of the type that could potentially satisfy Lyondell’s good faith
analysis. For diversion-of-value conflicts, one option for allowing such claims to
proceed would be to find it coercive for management to ask stockholders to
approve, in a single vote, both the merger and the diversion of value, and thus not
cleansing under Corwin. It is less clear this would be plausible in the risk-aversion
context. But to the extent that Corwin left the door open to claims targeting these
particular conflicts, the Court of Chancery should walk through

292.

See id.

